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MISCHIEF WITH MALICE: A REVIEW OF LIABILITY
FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE INSURED'S
RIGHT TO INDEMNITY AGAINST
AN EXEMPLARY AWARD
Mark C. Treanort

This Article begins with an examination of the law of
punitive damages, both in Maryland and in other jurisdictions. The author then discusses the question of whether an
insured has a right to indemnity against a punitive award,
focusing on the issues of insurance policy construction and
public policy. A detailed analysis of a recent Maryland
opinion on the subject is undertaken, and the author
concludes with several recommendations for the Maryland
judiciary and the legislature.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In First National Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit
Companyl the Court of Appeals of Maryland specifically held 2 that
public policy did not protect the Fidelity & Deposit Company of
Maryland from liability under the policy of insurance it had issued
to the First National Bank of St. Mary's for that portion of a
judgment entered against the Bank assessing exemplary damages. 3
Addressing the issue of insurance coverage for exemplary damages
for the first time, 4 the court appears implicitly to have sanctioned the
greatest departure to date from the previously espoused rationale for
awarding punitive damages in Maryland, while explicitly altering
the relationship between an insured and its insurer in terms of
coverage provided and the premium rates charged for that coverage. 5
This Article examines the new law concerning insurance
coverage for punitive damages in Maryland in light of prior

t

1.
2.

3.
4.

5.

B.S., 1968, United States Naval Academy; J.D., 1976, University of Maryland
School of Law; Associate, Miles & Stockbridge, Baltimore, Maryland.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Thomas S. Spencer,
Articles Editor, University of Baltimore Law Review, and Kevin G. Quinn, law
clerk, Miles & Stockbridge.
283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978) [hereinafter sometimes referred to as the F & D
case].
The majority opinion was written by Judge Smith. Joining him were Chief Judge
Murphy and Judges Eldridge, Orth, Cole, and Liss (specially assigned). Judge
Levine filed a dissenting opinion, 283 Md. at 243,389 A.2d at 367. It is interesting
to note that Judge Levine previously had written almost all of the court's
majority opinions in cases dealing with punitive damages since 1972.
283 Md. at 243, 389 A.2d at 367.
The issue has been addressed previously by a number of other jurisdictions, and
there is a definite split of opinion on the subject. See text accompanying note 55
infra.
See text accompanying notes 139-74 infra.

1979]

Punitive Damages

223

Maryland decisions dealing with punitive damages issues and with
regard to the case law in other jurisdictions that have addressed the
subject. In doing so an attempt is made to draw attention to
questions left, unresolved by the court's decision in the F & D case
and to suggest areas in which further judicial or legislative guidance
is needed.

II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MARYLAND
A. The Rationale Behind Punitive Awards
A variety of rationales have been expressed as justification for
the award of punitive damages. The courts allowing "punitive" or
"exemplary" damages are generally in agreement - though
individual courts' expressions of the rationale may differ slightly that such damages are levied against a wrongdoer as a means of
punishment because of his particularly aggravated misconduct and
as a deterrent to others, warning them that similar conduct on their
part will be dealt with harshly.6
A few courts stray from this punishment/deterrent rationale,
asserting that punitive damages may be viewed in a limited sense as
compensatory. In that sense they are allowed as compensation for a
plaintiffs wounded feelings as a roundabout means of compensation
for the infliction of mental distress. 7 A third theory asserted by a few
courts - and probably an underlying unspoken feeling of most - is
what might be termed the "private attorney general" rationale.
Courts ascribing to this theory assert that punitive damages should
be allowed on the supposition that civil prosecution of persons guilty
of aggravated misconduct is desirable, and the award of punitive
damages is a necessary encouragement to potential litigants who,
perhaps because of the likelihood of receiving only a small
compensatory damages award, would not otherwise sue. S
In Maryland it is well settled that a plaintiff may in the proper
case 9 be awarded punitive damages. Though an undercurrent

6. See W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS 9 (4th ed. 1971)[hereinafter cited as
PROSSER]; D. DOBBS, LAw OF REMEDIES §3.9 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS];
22 AM. JUR.2d Damages §§ 236, 237 (1965); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 117(1) (1966);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (Tent. Draft, 1973).
7. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 9; DOBBS, supra note 6, at 204-05.
8. PROSSER, supra note 6, at 10; DOBBS, supra note 6, at 205.
9. In Maryland, punitive damages are allowable in most actions sounding in tort.
See, e.g., Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976) (fraud);
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972) (negligent
entrustment); Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972)
(invasion of privacy); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 2&7 A.2d 251
(1972) (false imprisonment); Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283
A.2d 392 (1971) (assault, battery, false imprisonment); Associate Discount Corp.
v. Hillary, 262 Md. 570, 278 A.2d 592 (1971) (trespass); American Stores v. Byrd,
229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962) (defamation). Punitive· damages may not be
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encompassing all of the above-discussed theories may be found in
the Maryland cases, the continuously expressed rationale behind the
award had been the need to punish the offender for his grievous
wrong, and in doing so, to set an example for others.!O

B.

The Malice Requirement

Evaluation of the feasibility of bringing or defending a punitive
damages case necessarily begins with an assessment of the most

awarded, however, in a pure contract action, i.e. an action for breach brought by
one party against the other. See, e.g., Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md.
309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972). On the other hand, they may be awarded for a cause of
action that has arisen out of a contractual relationship, such as the tort of
interference with contract. See Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514,
366 A.2d 1 (1976); H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975);
Daugherty v. Kessler, 264 Md. 281, 286 A.2d 95 (1972); Damazo v. Wahby, 259
Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); Rinaldi v. Tana, 252 Md. 544, 250 A.2d 533 (1969);
McClung-Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961).
Plaintiffs seeking punitive damages must bring their actions in a court of
law; a court of equity lacks the power to grant punitive awards, even if the facts
of a given case would justify their imposition at law. See, e.g., Superior Constr.
Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 104 A.2d 581, 48 A.L.R.2d 932 (1954) (an extensive review
of Maryland's and other jurisdictions' rulings on the issue). Although by bringing an action in equity a plaintiff waives his claim to punitive damages, there
appears to be a gray area in equity - perhaps analogous to the ephemeral basis
of recovery for pain and suffering - in which, when determining the amount of
compensatory damages to be awarded, the chancellor may take into consideration the motive of the wrongdoer. The tort-feasor's bad motive then may be
reflected in the increased assessment of compensatory damages without actually
acknowledging that such an increase is the equivalent of a punitive award. Id.
As a practical matter, when seeking both compensatory and punitive
damages combined with a plea for equitable relief, as in a cause of action for
libel, one may avoid forfeiting a claim to an exemplary award by bringing an
action at law for damages and seeking an injunction at law as ancillary relief
under MD. RULES BF 40-43. See Prucha v. Weiss, 233 Md. 479, 197 A.2d 253, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 992 (1964).
Actions based wholly or in part upon statutory rights present different
problems. Survival actions and actions for wrongful death are examples and
must be clearly distinguished. Punitive damages are not recoverable in a
wrongful death action brought under MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-904
(Supp. 1978) because the rights of the plaintiff are created by statute, and the
recoverable damages are specifically limited thereby. Smith v. Gray Concrete
Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972). Survival actions, however, brought by
the administrator of the decedent's estate under MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN.
§ 7-401 (1974), are not predicated upon a new cause of action created by statute,
as are wrongful death actions. The plaintiffs claim in a survival action is one
the decedent could have maintained himself had he lived to do so. Hence, even
though not expressly authorized by statute, a personal representative may
recover punitive damages in any case where they might have been awarded to
the decedent had the latter survived the defendant's wrongful act. Smith v. Gray
Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
10. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977); Gaither
v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536 (1857); cf. Pratt v. Ayler, 4 H. & J. 349 (Md. 1817) (criminal
intentions in civil assault and battery case may be considered by jury in
awarding damages). In light of the F & D decision, however, the validity of the
warning rationale may now be open to some question. See text accompanying
notes 139-74 infra.

1979]

Punitive Damages

225

critical point of such a case - the likelihood of establishing that the
defendant acted with "malice" as that term is construed by the
courts of Maryland. The determination of whether the defendant
acted with malice is the crucial issue in an action for punitive
damages, for without such a finding no case can be established for
an exemplary award.
The question "What is malice?" cannot be answered directly for
in reality it appears to be whatever conduct by the defendant is so
offensive that the court or jury believes him to be worthy of
punishment. At one extreme might be the case where a defendant
has clearly acted in a spirit of outright hatred toward the plaintiff,
leaving little doubt that his wicked acts are deserving of the jury's,
or perhaps ultimately the Court of Appeals', wrath. The threshold at
the other end of the spectrum over which a defendant must have
stepped to be found deserving of punishment is not as easily
recognized.
The basic criteria by which to judge a defendant on the punitive
damages issue was stated in the oft-cited 1884 case of Philadelphia,
Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Hoeflich. ll In reversing the
lower court's assessment of punitive damages against a conductor
who had wrongfully and forcibly ejected a passenger from a train,
the Court of Appeals enunciated guidelines that have purportedly
controlled the court decisions in Maryland punitive damages cases
for the better part of a century:
The force and deliberation with which the wrongful act
is done, are not necessarily the tests by which the question
of punitive damages is to be determined. On the contrary, to
entitle one to such damages there must be an element of
fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or oppression entering into
and forming part of the wrongful act.
. . . [T]o entitle the plaintiff to recover punitive damages
. the jury must find that the wrongful act was done
wantonly, or wilfully, or in the spirit of oppression. It is the
evil motive or intention with which the wrongful act is done
... on which rests the rule of punitive damages. l2
The Hoeflich holding was translated by the court into a two-part
rule for evaluating defendant's conduct. One part demanded a
finding of an actual, real, evil motive. The alternative second part
tempered the first by equating malice with a recklessness, closely
bordering on the intentional disregard of plaintiffs rights.
Hence in Heinze v. Murphy,l3 the court stated that,
11. 62 Md. 300 (1884).
12. ld. at 307, 309.
13. 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942).
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A wrong motive must accompany the wrongful act, and
without proof of malice or some other aggravation, exemplary damages cannot be recovered.14
The terms "malice" and "wanton" were defined in stark, sharp
terms in Dennis v. Baltimore Transit CO.:15
The word 'malice', as used in the rule for imposition of
punitive damages, signifies that the defendant was influenced by hatred and spite and that he indulged in deliberate
and wilful mischief to injure that plaintiff.
The word 'wanton' means characterized by extreme
recklessness and utter disregard for the rights of others.16
Following those definitions the court pronounced the test to be
used in evaluating defendant's conduct:
We specifically hold that, in a suit for [punitive·
damages] ... it must be shown by the plaintiff in order to
recover punitive damages that the [defendant] not only
acted wrongfully but without just cause or excuse, and with
the evil motive to injure or oppress, or at least with a
reckless disregard of the rights of the person injured. 17
Entangled in the court's pronouncements about the meaning of
malicious or wanton conduct has been the semantic battle over
distinctions between "actual" malice and "implied" malice. At first
glance one might conclude that the court was demanding proof of a
visceral, gut-felt hatred underlying defendant's conduct. Indeed in
1971 the Court of Appeals stated in Drug Fair of Maryland v.
Smith,ls
Actual or express malice may be characterized as the
performance of an unlawful act, intentionally or wantonly,
without legal justification or excuse but with an evil or
rancorous motive influenced by hate: the purpose being to
deliberately and willfully injure the plaintiff. 19
Strong language that! But that language is subject to tempering
by the notion that besides an actual loathesome hating, which is
clearly "actual" malice, there is a "legal equivalent" of that hatred

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 429, 24 A.2d at 921.
189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948).
Id. at 616-17,56 A.2d at 817.
Id. at 617, 56 A.2d at 817.
263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971).
Id. at 352, 283 A.2d at 398.
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which, if established by plaintiff, may entitle him to recover
punitive damages in certain cases.20 That legal equivalent of malice
has been characterized as an action by defendant "accompanied by
. fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness, oppressiveness, willful
disregard of the plaintiffs rights, or other circumstances tending to
aggravate the injury."21 Until recent years, however, it was not clear
whether a plaintiff, in any given case, was required to prove actual
malice or only to meet the somewhat less onerous burden of
establishing its legal equivalent of implied malice. 22
In a series of cases beginning in 1975, the Court of Appeals set
forth guidelines to be followed in making that determination. In H &
R Block, Inc. v. Testerman,23 the plaintiffs had sued in both tort and
contract alleging that H & R Block had "negligently, wantonly,
maliciously and intentionally" prepared their income tax returns
incorrectly.24 Labeling the plaintiffs' claim as one for "a negligent
breach of contract,"25 the court held that where the tort for which a
punitive damages recovery is sought is one that arises out of a
contractual relationship, actual malice as described above is a
prerequisite to the recovery of punitive damages. 26 Though in later

20. See, e.g., Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972); St.
Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturer's Life Ins. Co., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12,
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Vancherie v. Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356
(1966); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917 (1942).
21. McClung·Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 148, 172 A.2d 494, 500 (1961).
22. See generally McCadden, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases in Maryland, 6 U.
BALT. L. REV. 203 (1977).
23. 275 Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975).
24. Id. at 37-38, 338 A.2d at 49.
25. Id. at 48, 338 A.2d at 55.
26. Id. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54. In so holding, the court cited a number of prior cases,
which it said foreshadowed the rule stated in Testerman. See Siegman v.
Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972); Daugherty v. Kessler, 264
Md. 281, 286 A.2d 95 (1972); St. Paul at Chase Corp. v. Manufacturer's Life Ins.
Co., 262 Md. 192, 278 A.2d 12, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971); Damazo v.
Wahby, 259 Md. 627, 270 A.2d 814 (1970); Knickerbocker Co. v. Gardiner Co., 107
Md. 556, 69 A. 405 (1908).
The court also distinguished Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149,
297 A.2d 721 (1972), the only case in which the Court of Appeals has held that
punitive damages could be recovered for an automobile tort. In Gray, the
majority, over Judge Smith's strong dissenting view that the court was usurping
legislative prerogatives, departed from the stark strictness of Hoeflich by
formulating a test based largely upon the theories found in cases dealing with
the crime of manslaughter by motor vehicle:
We regard a "wanton or reckless disregard for human life" in the
operation of a motor vehicle, with the known dangers and risks
attendant to such conduct, as the legal equivalent of malice. It is a
standard which, although stopping just short of willful or intentional
injury, contemplates conduct which is of an extraordinary or outrageous
character.
267 Md. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731. The court in H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275
Md. 36, 338 A.2d 48 (1975), later indicated that the Gray holding "is confined to a
wanton or reckless disregard for human life and the operation of a motor
vehicle." Id. at 47, 338 A.2d at 54 (emphasis in original).
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opinions 27 the court drew the distinction between pure tort cases and
cases in which the tort arose from a contractual relationship, the
first detailed explanation of the distinction drawn by the court
between pure tort and tort arising out of contract causes of action
came in General Motors Corp. v. Piskor.28 Describing the latter type
of case, the court observed that
[a] common thread runs through all these cases. In each
instance, the tortious conduct and the contract were so
intertwined that one could not be viewed in isolation from
the other. Indeed, a conspicuous number of the cases in
which the actual malice rule has been applied concern
tortious inducement to breach a contract. In still others, the
tort consisted of nothing more than an allegedly negligent
performance of contract obligations, to the extent that the
tort action was accompanied by a separate cause of action
sounding in contract. In one form or another, then, the tort
arose directly from performance or breach of contract. 29
The court distinguished cases that had involved only tangential
contractual relationships. It noted that the torts for which punitive
damages had been sought in those cases could not have been found
to have arisen out of the contractual relationship because there was
no direct connection between the contract and the tort in question. 30
The court's holding relied upon this distinction:
In order, then, for an alleged wrong to constitute a "tort
arising out of a contractual relationship," thereby necessitating proof of common law actual malice to permit recovery
of punitive damages, we require that there be a direct nexus
between the tortious act and performance or breach of the
terms and conditions of the parties' underlying contract. 31
It is now clear, therefore, that when considering the possibility
of the jury's awarding punitive damages and evaluating the malice
requirement in the case, the parties must not only draw a distinction

27. See, e.g., Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976);
Henderson v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 278 Md. 514, 366 A.2d 1 (1976); Food Fair
Stores v. Hevey, 275 Md. 50, 338 A.2d 43 (1975).
28. 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16 (1977).
29. Id. at 637, 381 A.2d at 2l.
30. Id. at 637-38, 381 A.2d at 22 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275
Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 298
A.2d 16 (1972); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 287 A.2d 251 (1972);
Vancherie v. Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356 (1966); Dennis v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948».
31. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 640, 381 A.2d 16, 23 (1977).
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between tort and contract causes of action,32 but must also closely
examine the type of tort and the relationship between the parties
from which the cause of action arises.

c. Proof of Malice
It has long been recognized that malice, fraud, deceit, and
wrongful motive are seldom admitted and most often must be
inferred from acts and circumstantial evidence, and need not be
proved by direct evidence. 33 Hence the trier of fact may draw an
inference of malice or its legal equivalent from both direct and
circumstantial evidence. To entitle a plaintiff to a punitive recovery,
malice usually must be proved as a distinct matter different from the
basic elements of the tort at issue. In the case of malicious
prosecution, however, punitive damages may always be awarded
whenever the defendant is held liable for the tort itself.34 The malice
that constitutes one element of the tort is sufficient to support a
punitive award. 35

D. Imputing Malice
As well as being inferred from the facts of a case, malice may
also be imputed from the circumstances surrounding defendant's
acts. If punitive damages are not recoverable against one's agent,
they may not be assessed on the basis of the agency relationship
against the principal himself.36 If, however, the agent is found to
have acted with malice, that malice may be attributable to the
principal if the agent's conduct was within the scope of his
employment. 37 In order to impute the agent's malice to the principal,
there is no need for affirmative proof that the employer authorized,
participated in, or ratified the tortious act of his employee, as long as
the latter was acting in furtherance of his master's business. 38
Furthermore, the defendant employer generally has the burden of

32. The Piskor court reiterated the rationale behind the rule that punitive damages
could not be awarded in actions for breach of contract. See 281 Md. at 638-39,
381 A.2d at 22.
33. McClung·Logan Equip. Co. v. Thomas, 226 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961); Geisey
v. Holberg, 185 Md. 642, 653, 45 A.2d 735, 740 (1946).
34. See, e.g., American Stores v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962); Newton v.
Spence, 20 Md. App. 126, 316 A.2d 837 (1974).
35. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228,
389 A.2d 359 (1978); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16
(1972); American Stores v. Byrd, 229 Md. 5, 181 A.2d 333 (1962).
36. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
37. Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 306 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 269
Md. 756 (1973).
38. Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); Freeman
Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 306 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 269 Md. 756
(1973).
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proving to the jury that the defendant employee was not engaged in
the course of his employment when the act was performed. 39 That
burden of proof is not one that is readily met.
Significantly, the question of the master's liability does not turn
on the quality of the act performed or the method by which that act
is accomplished. Punitive liability instead turns simply upon a
determination of whether the servant performed the act in the line of
duty and within. the scope of authority conferred upon him by the
master.40 Only if the jury finds that the employee's acts were
motivated solely and exclusively by some personal motive unrelated
to his position as an employee, will the employer escape liability.41
Hence, although the servant's mode of action may exceed all
reasonable bounds that a rational employer would expect him to use
in his duties, if the tortious act occurred in the performance of those
duties, punitive damages may be assessed against the master.42

E. Other Jury Considerations
The existence or nonexistence of malice is a question of fact to be
determined by the jury, although the trial judge may not allow the
jury to speculate that there were sufficient grounds for an award of
punitive damages when in reality there were none. 43 Many other
factors besides the definition of malicious conduct must, of course,
also be considered. Given the right set of facts, a defendant has the
right to have the judge instruct the jury that it should take into
consideration the provocative acts and words of the plaintiff in
mitigation of the punitive damages it might assess against the
defendant. 44 Similarly, in those cases where probable cause has been
a factor in defendant's actions, such as false arrest, the existence of
probable cause, while not necessarily a defense to the act, may be
shown in mitigation of punitive damages. 45

39. Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 126,316 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 271 Md. 741 (1974).
40. See, e.g., Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971);
Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 306 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 269
Md. 756 (1973); ct. Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813
(1948) (street car conductor maliciously ordered arrest of passenger while
transacting the carrier's business).
41. Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 126,316 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 271 Md. 741 (1974).
42. Boyer & Co. v. Coxen, 92 Md. 366, 48 A. 161 (1901) (a vivid example of the
proposition - the employee had viciously beaten a salesman with a monkey
wrench). See also cases cited at notes 74-80 infra.
43. Baltimore Transit Co. v. Faulkner, 179 Md. 598, 20 A.2d 485 (1941).
44. Vancherie v. Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356 (1966); Feinberg v. George
Washington Cemetery, 226 Md. 393, 174 A.2d 72 (1961); Dennis v. Baltimore
Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24
A.2d 917 (1942).
45. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643,261 A.2d 731 (1970); Clark's Park
v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 227 A.2d 726 (1967); Fleisher v. Ensminger, 140 Md.
604, 118 A. 153 (1922).
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The award of a punitive damages recovery is not a matter of
right. Although punitive damages are purportedly awarded on public
policy grounds as a punishment for, and as a deterrent against,
malicious conduct, they are not meant to compensate plaintiff for his
loss, and generally there can be no award of exemplary damages in
favor of one who has proved no actual compensable loss.46
If the jury does determine that the defendant acted with malice
and that compensatory damages should be awarded, it may also
award such an amount of exemplary damages as the jurors in their
discretion see fit upon consideration of all of the attendant
circumstances of the case. 47
In Maryland, unlike several other jurisdictions, there is no
requirement that there be some ratio established between the
compensatory award and the amount ofthe punitive damages. 48 The
jury's discretion should not be unlimited, utterly arbitrary, or be
exercised with passion, prejudice, or bias,49 and may be subject to the
trial court's order of remittitur. 50 Upon appeal, however, the court
generally will not disturb the trial judge's discretion in denying a

46. Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 291 A.2d 64 (1972); B. & B. Refrigeration &
Air Conditioning Servo Co., Inc. v. Stander, 263 Md. 577,284 A.2d 244 (1971). See
also Wolf v. Levitt & Sons, 267 Md. 623, 298 A.2d 374 (1972); Delisi v. Garnett,
257 Md. 4, 261 A.2d 784 (1970). In the realm of punitive damages the requirement
that a plaintiff establish the existence of such harm translates into the necessity
for proof, and recovery, of compensatory damages. While every technical
invasion of one's legal rights may give rise to a cause of action for the recovery
of nominal damages (generally a trivial sum such as one cent or one dollar), it is
clear that in Maryland recovery of merely technical nominal damages will not,
in all but a few special cases, afford a basis for recovery of punitive damages.
The exceptions to this requirement of a substratum award of actual compensatory damages appear to be actions involving the torts of malicious prosecution and
cases of slander or defamation. See, e.g., Nance v. Gall, 187 Md. 656, 50 A.2d 120
(1946), modified, 187 Md. 656, 51 A.2d 535 (1947); Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App.
126, 316 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 271 Md. 741 (1974).
The relationship between compensatory and punitive awards presents
another potential problem in those actions involving a remittitur. Following a
jury award of both compensatory and punitive damages, the trial judge may
grant a judgment n.o.v. on the punitive damages issue and also grant
defendant's motion for a new trial on the compensatory damages issue unless
plaintiff agrees to a remittitur of part of the compensatory damages. If plaintiff
accepts the remittitur, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal on
the punitive damages issue. Kneas v. Hecht Co., 257 Md. 121,262 A.2d 518 (1970);
Turner v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 158 A.2d 125
(1960).
47. Galusca v. Dodd, 189 Md. 666, 57 A.2d 313 (1948); Dennis v. Baltimore Transit
Co., 189 Md. 610, 56 A.2d 813 (1948); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 24 A.2d 917
(1942).
48. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 287 A.2d 251 (1972).
49. See 8 M.L.E. Damages § 113 (1960); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 126(1) (1966).
50. See Kneas v. Hecht Co., 257 Md. 121, 262 A.2d 518 (1970); Turner v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 158 A.2d 125 (1960).
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new trial because of the inadequacy or insufficiency of the award or
overturn the verdict because of its size. 51
Because punitive damages should be assessed in an amount that
will punish the malicious defendant, there is no set formula by
which the jury may calculate the proper amount of the exemplary
award. As closely as possible the punishment should be made to fit
not only the enormity of the act but also the particular circumstances of the actor.
Damages which may constitute proper punishment or
provide a sufficient deterrent in the case of a defendant of
modest means may not serve those purposes so far as a more
affluent defendant is concerned. Conversely a verdict that
would scarcely be regarded by a wealthy man, might be
ruinous to a poor man. 52
In order to assist the jury in arriving at a determination of the
amount of punitive damages to be assessed, the plaintiff has been
permitted to introduce evidence of defendant's financial worth. 53 In
the same light it seems that an impecunious defendant should be
able to introduce evidence of his financial status in an attempt to
lessen the amount of exemplary damages that the jury may assess
against him. 54

III. INSURANCE COVERAGE
Traditionally, the Maryland courts have sanctioned the imposition of a punitive assessment only against those defendants who
had acted with "malice" toward the persons whom they had

51. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Md. 578, 287 A.2d 251 (1972); Freeman
Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 427-28, 306 A.2d 548, 554, cert. denied,
269 Md. 756 (1973) (citing Bell v. Morrison, 27 Miss. 68, 86 (1854».
Cases involving multiple torts, however, present a particular problem for the
calculation of a punitive award. In such actions it is incumbent upon the trial
judge to instruct the jury that even though plaintiffs claim may be stated in
separate counts, it must determine whether the alleged facts occurred in actuality
in one continuous transaction. If so, the plaintiff will not be allowed to pyramid
his punitive damages into several different awards, but may receive only one
award based upon defendant's malicious actions considering the transactions as
a whole. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, 267 Md. 406, 298 A.2d 16 (1972); Drug
Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (197l); Newton v. Spence, 20
Md. App. 126, 316 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 27l Md. 741 (1974).
52. Freeman Assocs., Inc. v. Murray, 18 Md. App. 419, 306 A.2d 548, cert. denied, 269
Md. 756 (1973).
53. Jd.; Fennell v. G.A.C. Fin. Corp., 242 Md. 209, 218 A.2d 492 (1966). The decision in
First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d
359 (1978), however, has placed the use of this procedure in considerable doubt.
See text accompanying notes 139-74 infra.
54. Cf. Nance v. Gall, 187 Md. 656, 50 A.2d 120 (1946), modified, 51 A.2d 535 (1947)
(evidence as to defendant's financial responsibility could have been offered to the
jury, although none was introduced).
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damaged. Further, the courts have determined that that award
should be granted in such an amount as would provide for deterrence
and punishment in light of each individual case's circumstances of
wrongdoing and the defendant's financial condition. Prior to the F &
D case, however, no appellate level decision in Maryland had
addressed the question of whether a wrongdoer who had been found
to have acted with malice and had therefore had an exemplary
award assessed against him could be indemnified by his insurer for
such punitive damages.
A. Other Jurisdictions
The question of whether an insurance company must indemnify
its insured against a punitive damages award assessed against it
has been addressed by less than one-half of the jurisdictions in this
county. Most of those cases deal with motor vehicle torts and
therefore interpret automobile liability insurance policies. The
reported decisions show a definite split among the authorities. 55
Determination of the issue of whether an insurance company
must indemnify its insured against punitive damages assessed
against him requires a two-fold analysis. The first question to be
decided is whether the language of the applicable insurance policy

55. Cases holding against insurance coverage for punitive damages include Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S.
734 (1935) (applying Missouri law); Gleason v. Fryer, 30 Colo. 106, 491 P.2d 85
(1971); Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971);
Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934); Sterling Ins.
Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 194 So. 2d 622
(1964); Nicholson v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); Padavan v.
Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1973); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins.
Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1969).
Cases that have permitted insurance coverage for punitive damages include
Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thorton, 244 F.2d
823 (4th Cir. 1957) (applying South Carolina law); General Cas. Co. of America v.
Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956) (applying Tennessee law); Fagot v.
Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978) (applying Louisiana law); Norfolk v.
Western Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind.
1976) (applying Indiana law); Concord General Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345 F.
Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972) (applying Maine law); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Janich, 3 F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (applying California law); Capital
Motor Lines v. Loring, 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939); Employers Ins. Co. of Ala.
v. Brock, 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937); American Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Werfel,
230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103, aff'd, 231 Ala. 285, 164 So. 383 (1935); Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Baker, 304 Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (Ct. App. 1947); Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 698, 220 S.E.2d 403 (1975); Carroway v. Johnson, 245
S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477
S.W.2d 341 (Tex. App. 1972). See cases cited at note 144 infra. See generally
Anderson, Indemnity Against Punitive Damages, 27 Sw. L.J. 593 (1973)
[hereinafter ANDERSON]; STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY IN PERSONAL INJURY
AND DEATH ACTIONS § 201 (1972) [hereinafter STEIN]; Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343
(1968).
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should be construed to provide for indemnity against such damages.
An affirmative answer to that question requires consideration of a
second: Would such indemnity against exemplary damages violate
the public policy of the jurisdiction? Courts addressing the problem
have differed in their approaches, some discussing only one or the
other of these questions, others discussing both.

B. Insurance Policy Construction
The courts that have addressed the construction issue have often
differed on their interpretations of essentially the same policy
language. Further, although some cases have held against indemnity on the basis of construction of the language of the insurance
policy involved, most indicate, explicity or implicitly, that the court's
decision was based in part on public policy considerations also. 56
Courts construing policies in such a way as to deny coverage for
punitive damages have found that language providing for indemnity
against damages assessed "because of bodily injury" or "because of
property damage" precluded exemplary damages because exemplary
damages are assessed as punishment for a defendant's wrongful
acts and as a deterrent to others, not "because of' bodily injury.
Hence, in Universal Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tenery,57 an auto
negligence case, the court stated that,
. . . the policy indemnifies against damages for bodily
injuries, and nothing in addition is contracted for, and there
is no further' liability. The injured will not be allowed to
collect from a non-participating party, for a wrong against
the public. 58

56. Cases that have held against indemnity on the basis of construction of the
insurance policy language include Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533,
18 A.2d 357 (1941); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); LoRocco v.
New Jersey Manufacturer's Indem. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591, cert.
denied, 42 N.J. 144, 199 A.2d 65~ (1964).
Cases that have refused indemnity on the basis of public policy considerations include Surety Co. of New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966);
Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962); Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co. 75 F.2d 58 (5th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734
(1935); Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 16 Ariz. App. 514, 494 P.2d 711
(1972); Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934);
Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Nicholson
v. American Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Padavan v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d 694 (App. Div.
1973); Teska v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Dist. Ct.
1969); Cavin's, Inc. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N.C. App. 698, 220 S.E.2d 403
(1975); Edmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
57. 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
58. Id. at 17, 39 P.2d at 779. See also Gleason v. Fryer, 30 Colo. 106, 491 P.2d 85
(1971); Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971);
Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941) (statutory
multiple damages for injuries resulting from willful violation of traffic
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Other courts faced with similar language have not found it a
barrier to indemnity. Construing such standard language as "to pay
on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injuries,"
courts holding in favor of punitive coverage have often focused on
the term "all sums" and found the provisions broad enough to
warrant recovery. 59 Courts construing such language in favor of
coverage for punitive assessments have stressed that the voluntary
contracts in question did not specifically exclude punitive damages,
were free of ambiguity, and hence could be construed against the
insurer. 60

C. Public Policy Considerations
The courts that have approached the issue of whether punitive
damages may be covered by insurance from the point of view of
public policy considerations have split in their opinions of the
validity of indemnification for damages that are allegedly imposed
for punishment and deterrence. The oft-cited opinion of the Fifth

regulations; held that policy language should be construed narrowly in light of
public policy against indemnity for penalties imposed because of a public wrong);
Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
59. See, e.g., General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956)
(reliance solely upon construction of policy language obligating the insurer "to
pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated
to pay by reason of the liability ... imposed upon him by law . . . for damages
... sustained ... by any person ... "); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345
F. Supp. 1090 (D. Me. 1972); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Lazenby v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). See also Carroway v.
Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965), where the court relied upon
construction of the policy provision "To pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of:
A. bodily injury ... sustained by any person ... arising out of the ... use of
the owned automobile, or any non-owned automobile . . . . " The court then
determined that the obligation to pay "all sums" that the insured was legally
obligated to pay as damages included punitive damages. It further resolved that
punitive damages are also "damages because of bodily injury," stating that the
average insured would expect that the policy afforded coverage of all claims for
any kind of damages arising out of his use of his automobile. Id. at 204, 139
S.E.2d at 909 (citing T.J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4312 at
132-33 (1962». Accord, Fagot v. Ciravola, 445 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. La. 1978) (policy
held to provide indemnity against punitive liability of policemen for violation of
plaintiffs civil rights); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
420 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. Ind. 1976); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3
F.R.D. 16 (S.D. Cal. 1943); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Danill, 246
Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969).
60. See, e.g., Greenwood Cemetery, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232
S.E.2d 910 (1977) (finding no specific exclusion of punitive damages but noting
the exclusion for criminal acts in a unique cemetery liability policy); Abbie
Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511
P.2d 783 (1973); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199,567 P.2d 1013 (1977);
Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Northwestern National Casualty Co. v.
McNult y 61 is the leading decision holding against insurance
coverage for punitive damages. The policy in question in McNulty
was a family combination automobile policy issued to one Smith, a
resident of Virginia. Smith, while intoxicated, was involved in a
high speed, hit-and-run accident in Florida, which caused McNulty
extreme injury, including permanent brain damage. A Florida court
awarded both compensatory and punitive damages, and McNulty
then brought an ancillary garnishment proceeding against the
insurer in federal district court. The insurer appealed from the
portion of the ensuing judgment allowing recovery of punitive
damages under the insurance policy. The insurance company argued
both that the language of the policy did not cover exemplary
damages, and that, even if the policy construction would permit
coverage, such coverage would violate public policy. The Fifth
Circuit did not even consider the language construction issue;
instead, it based its holding against coverage entirely upon public
policy grounds. The court stated that the fundamental purposes of
exemplary damages are punishment and· deterrence, and, therefore,
the burden of paying such damages should rest upon the wrongdoer.
The court noted that an attempt to shift the burden to insurance
companies would result in increased insurance premiums and that
society would, therefore, actually be punishing itself. Analogizing to
criminal misconduct and the public policy against insurance
against criminal fines, the court stated that the same public policy
should invalidate contracts of insurance against "the civil punishment that punitive damages represents" so that a person does not
gain "a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment
of sanctions against such misconduct."62
The McNulty court found that three substantial practical
difficulties weighed against allowing coverage for punitive damages.
First, such coverage would produce a serious conflict of interest
between the insurer and the insured in settlement negotiations and
trial tactics. 63 Second, there would be a conflict between the rule that
the defendant's financial standing may be considered in assessing
punitive damages and the rule against referring to the defendant's
insurance in the presence of the jury. 64 Third, jury verdicts for small
compensatory damages and gigantic punitive assessments could
cause results having no relation to making the injured party whole
and would therefore be justifiable only if the wrongdoer himself paid
the amount assessed by the jury as punishment. 65

61. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
62. Id. at 440.
63. Id. at 441.
64. Id.
65.Id.
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In reaching its holding, however, the majority laid greatest
stress upon the fact that many people are maimed or killed in
highway accidents and vehemently argued that depriving socially
irresponsible drivers of insurance coverage for punitive damages
would act as a deterrent to reckless driving. 66
The leading case contrary to the McNulty rationale is Lazenby
v. Universal Underwriters Insurance CO.67 In Lazenby, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee first held that the policy language in question
provided for indemnity against a punitive award. 68 The Lazenby
court then acknowledged that the primary purposes of punitive
damages in Tennessee are punishment and deterrence and cited
extensively from the McNulty decision. The court, however, declined
to follow McNulty for several reasons. First, the court observed that
even though highway accident deaths and injuries are a very serious
problem, forbidding the payment of punitive damages through
insurance would not necessarily accomplish the result of deterring
drivers from their wrongful conduct. 69 Second, the court found that
the policy language had been construed by most courts at the time to
cover punitive damages,70 and opined that the average policy holder
reading the policy would believe he was protected against all claims
not intentionally inflicted.7 1 Third, it was noted that there is often a
fine line between simple negligence and the type of negligence upon
which a punitive award can be made. 72 The court concluded that to
deny coverage of exemplary damages would result in a partial
voiding of the contract between the insurance company and its
insured, and, declaring that partial voiding of private contracts
should not be done except in the clearest of cases, found no
persuasive public policy reasons for denying insurance coverage for
the punitive award. 73

D. Vicarious Liability
In cases in which an insured has been found only vicariously
liable for its agent's wrongdoing, the courts have had little difficulty
in allowing indemnity against a punitive award assessed against
the insured. The proposition that public policy does not preclude
indemnity against punitive damages that have been awarded on the

66. Id. at 441-42. The concurring opinion was skeptical of the argument that
depriving irresponsible drivers of insurance coverage would deter reckless
driving. Id. at 444.
67. 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
68. Id. at 647, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
69.Id.
70.Id.
71. Id.
72.Id.
73.Id.
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basis of respondeat superior is generally designated by the
commentators in terms such as "the strong majority view."74 Even
those courts that would hold that indemnity for punitive damages
generally is against public policy have often carefully distinguished
situations dealing with such damages assessed against one whose
only liability is vicarious. 75
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Welfare Finance CO.,76 the
leading case concerning a vicarious liability situation, is illustrative
of the approach taken by the courts. In that case, arising in
Missouri, the insured corporation had been found vicariously liable
for its employee-truck driver's reckless and wanton act. The policy in
question insured the corporation
[a]gainst loss by reason of liability imposed by law upon the
assured for damages on account of bodily injuries . . .
accidentally sustained . . . by any person or persons, other
than employees of the assured. 77
The court construed that language as follows:
Since this policy clearly covers bodily damage through
negligence and since these punitive damages are imposed
because of the aggravated circumstances or form of this
negligence, such punitive damages must be regarded as
coming within the meaning of the policy. 78
Addressing the public policy issue, the court noted that
insurance against the consequences of intentional wrongdoing
would probably be against public policy and implied that public

74. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 55, at § 201; ANDERSON, supra note 55, at 605.
75. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 439-40 (5th Cir.
1962) ("[A] factor not always focused upon, yet of crucial importance, is the point
that if the employer did not participate in the wrong the policy of preventing the
wrongdoer from escaping the penalties for his wrong is inapplicable."). In
Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 194
So. 2d 622 (1964), the court stated,
[T]here is a distinction between the actual tort feasor and one only
vicariously liable and that therefore public policy is not violated by
construing a liability policy to include punitive damages recovered by an
inj!lred person where the insured did not participate in or authorize the
act.
ld. at 900 (footnote omitted). In so holding, the Sterling court determined that the
insurance policy term "accident" included the assault and battery since it was
committed by the servant without the insured's consent. Although the policy
insured against all damages "because of bodily injury," the court did not discuss
that terminology. The court was not confronted with the question of whether the
servant had been negligently hired.
76. 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935) (applying Missouri
law).
77. ld. at 58.
78. ld. at 59.
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policy might also be contravened by indemnifying an actual - as
opposed to a vicariously liable - wrongdoer against a punitive
assessment. 79 Holding that the insurer must indemnify the vicariously liable corporation against the punitive award, the court
reasoned that where there was no direct or indirect participation on
the part of the master in the commission of the act, no public policy
would be violated by protecting the master from the unauthorized
action of his servant:
A different situation is present where the sole liability of the
insured arises out of the relation of master and servant. If
the master participates in, authorizes, or knows in advance
that his servant will probably commit the unlawful injurious
act, then the situation may be analogous to where the
insured himself commits an intentional act with an intended
injury and the same reasons for holding a protecting policy
invalid as to such acts would exist. However, the court has
here found that there was no evidence that the servant
causing the injury here "had been instructed by plaintiff to
act in a negligent, wanton, wrongful or unlawful manner
towards [the injured], nor that the alleged negligence or
wrongful acts of [the servant] were necessary to the
performance by [the servant] of his duties as the employee of
plaintiff, nor that he had ever previously been guilty of such
or similar actions."so
IV. THE MARYLAND CASE
The F&D litigation was instituted in 1976. The issue, which
previously had been addressed by only a few jurisdictions, would
now be presented in Maryland: Should the insurance policy in
question be construed in a manner allowing for indemnity against a
punitive award? If so, would the public policy of the state allow for
such indemnity?
A. The Case In The Lower Court
1.

Background

In July, 1976 the First National Bank of St. Mary'sSl and
Thomas Combs, assistant manager of the Bank, brought a
declaratory action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County
against the Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland S2 in which the
Bank sought a declaration of its rights as insured and the rights of

79.Id.
BO. Id. at 60.
B!. Sometimes referred to herein as "the Bank."
B2. Sometimes referred to herein as "F & D."
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the Fidelity & Deposit Company as insurer under a "Special MultiPeril Policy for Financial Institutions" issued by F & D to the
Bank. 83 The declaratory judgment action sought answers to
questions arising from a prior action filed in April, 1976 by Mrs.
Alma Todd, a customer of the Bank, in the Circuit Court for St.
Mary's County84 against the Bank and Mr. Combs, alleging that the
Bank, through its officers, agents, and employees, including Combs,
had maliciously prosecuted Mrs. Todd. 85 Subsequently, the Bank
requested that the insurer provide a defense to the suit. F & D,
through its counsel, notified the Bank that it would provide
insurance coverage for, and undertake the defense of, the compensatory damages claim, but it would not provide insurance coverage for,
or a defense of, the punitive damages claim. Thereafter, as a result of
that communication, the Bank retained its own counsel to represent
it in the tort action. 86 Following the trial of that action, the jury
returned a verdict of $4,000 compensatory damages against Mr.
Combs and $4,000 compensatory and $8,000 punitive damages
against the Bank alone. 87
Before the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, the Bank
sought a judgment declaring that the insurer was obligated both to
undertake the complete defense on behalf of the Bank and Mr.
Combs in the Todd action irrespective of the types of damages
claimed, and to pay all counsel fees and costs, including costs of the
instant declaratory judgment action. 88 The Bank also sought a
finding that the insurer was obligated to pay on behalf of the Bank,
all sums, including punitive damages, that the Bank was obligated
to pay as a result of the Todd action. 89
Following a hearing,90 the trial judge, Howard S. Chasanow,
rendered what the appellate court described as a "scholarly and wellreasoned opinion"91 in which he held that the insurer was obligated

83. See Joint Record Extract at 32-38, First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389 A.2d 359 (1978) [hereinafter "Record"].
84. That action was later removed to the Circuit Court for Calvert County where it
was tried before a jury. An appeal was taken from the judgment in that case and
was heard by the Court of Appeals on certiorari granted prior to hearing in the
Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Appeals' decision in First Nat'l Bank of
St. Mary's v. Todd, 283 Md. 251, 389 A.2d 371 (1978), was also filed on July 18,
1978 as a companion decision to the F & D case.
85. Record at 7.
86.ld.
87. ld. at 7-8.
88. ld. at 8-9.
89. ld. at 9.
90. ld. at 72-102.
91. First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 230, 389
A.2d 359, 360 (1978). The trial court opinion in First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's at
Leonardtown v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., Law No. 64, 391 (Cir. Ct. for Prince
George's County, Maryland, filed June 28, 1977) is also contained in the Joint
Record Extract.
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to provide a defense in the Todd action on behalf of the Bank and
therefore was liable for the cost incurred by the Bank in that
defense. 92 Because the insurer had unjustifiably refused to defend
the Todd action from which the instant action arose,93 Judge
Chasanow held that the insured Bank could also recover the counsel
fees and costs incurred in bringing the declaratory judgment
proceeding as well as the counsel fees expended to defend the initial
action. 94
After deciding those two issues, the circuit court went on to rule
that the insurance policy in question did provide coverage for the
award of punitive damages assessed against the Bank,95 but that
public policy precluded insuring against direct, rather than vicarious, liability for punitive damages imposed against the Bank. 96
2.

Policy Construction

Since the Court of Appeals found the question was not properly
before it,97 it quickly disposed of the issue of whether the insurance
policy in question by its terms afforded coverage for the punitive
damages assessed against the Bank. With neither quotations from
the policy nor citation of authority, the court simply stated,
In this instance, we have examined the policy provision
in question and conclude that if the matter were properly
before us we would hold that the trial judge did not err in

92. Record at 10-12. The trial judge found the decision of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842
(1975), apposite to the case at bar. In Brohawn, the Court of Appeals held that an
insured is not deprived of his contractual right to have a defense provided by the
insurer when a conflict of interest between the two arises because the insured has
been sued under a declaration stating both a cause of action covered by the
policy and an alternative cause of action not covered by the policy:
When such conflict arises, the insured must be informed of the nature of
the conflict and given the right either to accept an independent attorney
selected by the insurer or to select an attorney himself to conduct his
defense. If the insured elects to choose his own attorney, the insurer must
assume the reasonable costs of the defense provided.
Id. at 414-15, 347 A.2d at 854.
93. Record at 12.
94. Id. at 12-13. Neither of these rulings was appealed. The circuit court noted that
one exception to the general rule that counsel fees are not a proper element of
damages was established in Cohen v. American Home Ins. Co., 255 Md. 334, 258
A.2d 225 (1969). In Cohen, the Court of Appeals held that when an insurer
unjustifiably refuses to defend a suit for damages and the insured brings a
declaratory judgment action, the insured may recover the counsel fees and costs
incurred in bringing the declaratory judgment proceeding as well as the counsel
fees expended to defend the initial action.
95. Record at 13-17.
96. Id. at 24.
97. First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 231, 389
A.2d 359, 361 (1978).
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determining that its provisions embraced an award for
exemplary damages. 98
In light of this statement, the following review of the rationale
applied by the lower court may provide some guidance to counsel
attempting to determine the scope of coverage of policy provisions as
they relate to coverage for awards of exemplary damages in
Maryland. 99
The "Special Multi-Peril Policy for Financial Institutions"
issued by F & D to the Bank explicitly provided coverage for the tort
of malicious prosecution and contained the following "personal
injury" liability endorsement:
I. COVERAGE - PERSONAL INJURY LIABILITY
The Company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of injury (herein called ((personal injury")
sustained by any person or organization and arising out of
one or more of the following offenses:
Group A - false arrest, detention or imprisonment, or
malicious prosecution;

. . . [T]he company shall have the right and duty to
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on
account of such personal injury even if any of the
allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent.
IV. AMENDED DEFINITION
When used in reference to this insured: 'damages' means
only those damages which are payable because of personal
injury arising out of an offense to which this insurance
applies. 100
The circuit court began its analysis by noting that although the
court was not aware of any cases involving the exact language in
the policy at bar, several courts had already decided that "very
similar" language in a liability policy provides coverage for punitive
damages. 101 Choosing two cases as illustrative of that proposition,

98.Id.
99. The Maryland appellate courts have not previously addressed the issue.
100. Record at 6 (trial opinion; emphasis in original).
101. Record at 14. See also Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir.
1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.w.2d 1 (1964); Concord Gen. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hills, 345
F. Supp. 1090 (S.D. Me. 1972); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477
S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d
133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1969).
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the court noted that in Carro way v. Johnson 102 the Supreme Court of
South Carolina had both pointed out that an insurer could inclq.de a
clause in its insurance contract restricting liability or excluding
coverage under certain conditions, and explained that punitive
damages could only be sustained if there was an award for actual
damages. Thereafter the South Carolina court construed the
following policy provision:

.

To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of: bodily injury . . . sustained by any person . . .
arising out of the . . . use of the owned automobile or any
non-owned automobile.
and held that the language was
sufficiently broad enough to cover liability for punitive
damages as such damages are included in the "sums" which
the insured is legally obligated to pay as damages because of
bodily injury within the meaning of the policy.103
The circuit court also quoted as follows from Southern Farm
Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Daniel104 in which the Arkansas
Supreme Court found coverage of punitive damages:
As we read the policy herein it agrees to pay on behalf of
the insurer all sums which the insured shall become
LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO PAY AS DAMAGES, because
of bodily injuries sustained. When we consider that under
our law, one cannot become legally obligated to pay punitive
damages unless actual damages have been sustained and
assessed, we find that punitive damages constitute a sum
which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injuries sustained. 105

In support of its contention that punitive damages were not
within the terms of its policy, F & D cited a 1973 Minnesota decision,
Caspersen v. Webber,106 which decided that punitive damages were
not included in "sums the insured shall be legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury." Judge Chasanow, however,
distinguished that case on the basis that the Minnesota court had

102.
103.
104.
105.

245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
[d. at 205. 139 S.E.2d at 910.
246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969).
[d. at 852, 440 S.W.2d at 584 (citing Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139
S.E.2d 908 (1965».
106. 298 Minn. 93, 213 N.W.2d 327 (1973).
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based its holding in part on the fact that in that state punitive
damages are recoverable without proof of actual damages and
therefore even in cases where there was no bodily injury, a plaintiff
nonetheless might be entitled to exemplary damages. lo7 The trial
judge noted that in Maryland, however, an award of punitive
damages is dependent upon actual damages or actual injury since no
punitive damages award can be made unless there is compensable
injury and compensatory damages are awarded. IDS
Of further significance to the circuit court was that the policy
under consideration expressly covered the offense of malicious
prosecution "for which the award of punitive damages is common in
Maryland," and yet the insurer had failed to explicitly exclude
punitive. damages from coverage under the policy.I09 The court stated
that, given that failure to specifically exclude punitive damages, it
would follow the rules that when the facts pertinent to a question of
insurance coverage are undisputed, the issue is one of construction
in light of the language employed in the contract, the subject matter,
and the surrounding circumstances. 110 In case of ambiguities the
policy is construed strictly against the company that prepared the
policy and in favor ofthe insured. l l l Accordingly, the court held that
the F & D policy language at most could be regarded as ambiguous
and therefore construed that language against F & D. Accordingly,
the court held that punitive damages are included in the language
"all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of injuries sustained by any person or organization." 11 2
3.

Public Policy Considerations

The approaches to the public policy questions taken by the Court
of Appeals and by the circuit court differed considerably. Judge
Chasanow began his analysis of the issue of whether insurance
coverage for the punitive damages assessed against the Bank would

107. Record at 15.
108. Record at 16 (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 446, 340
A.2d 705, 708 (1975) and Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 644,291 A.2d 64, 71
(1972». See note 46 supra.
109. Record at 16 (citing Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485,
_ , 502 P.2d 522, 525 (1972) ("In any event a court should not aid an insurer
which fails to exclude liability for punitive damages. Surely there is nothing in
the insuring clause that would forewarn an insured that such was to be the
intent of the parties."». But see text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
110. Record at 15-16 (citing Wirterwerp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 Md. 714, 717, 357
A.2d 350, 352-53 (1976) and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Humphrey. 246 Md. 492, 496,229
A.2d 70, 72 (1967».
111. Record at 16 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Humphrey. 246 Md. 492, 496, 229 A.2d 70,
72 (1967».
112. Record at 16-17.
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be against public policy by stating that in states, like Maryland, l13
that impose punitive damages for punishment and deterrence and
not for compensation, "the weight of authority seems to be that it is
against public policy for an insurance company to indemnify an
individual tort-feasor for punitive damages as a result of his
personal misconduct."114 The court also pointed out that most
commentators favor the position that public policy should prevent
an insurance company from issuing a policy that covers a client's
liability for punitive damages for his own misconduct. ll5
In support of the proposition that one cannot insure against an
award of exemplary damages, the circuit court quoted at length from
the leading case holding against insurance coverage for such
damages, Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty: 11 6
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment
he gains a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the
establishment of sanctions against such misconduct. It is
not disputed that insurance against criminal fines or
penalties would be void as violative of public policy. The
same public policy should invalidate any contract of
insurance against the civil punishment that punitive
damages represent.
The policy considerations in a state where, as in Florida
and Virginia, punitive damages are awarded for punishment

113. The court cited Wolfv. Levitt and Sons, Inc., 267 Md. 623, 626, 298 A.2d 374, 376
(1972) and Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423, 430, 24 A.2d 917, 921 (1942). Record at
17.
114. Record at 17 (citing American Sur. Co. of New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th
Cir. 1966) (applying Kansas law»; Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307
F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying either Florida or Virginia law); American Ins.
Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965) (dicta, applying Connecticut
law); Nicholson v. American Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1965); Guardianship of Estate of Smith v. Merchants Mut. Bonding Co., 211
Kan. 397, 507 P.2d 189 (1973); Padovan v. Clemente, 43 A.D.2d 729, 350 N.Y.S.2d
694 (1973); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs. Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323,197
A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1964); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793
(1966).
- 115. Record at 18-19. See, e.g., STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY PERSONAL INJURY
AND DEATH ACTIONS § 201 (1972); Hall, The Validity of Insurance Coverage for
Punitive Damages - An Unresolved Question?, 4 N.M.L. REV. 65 (1973); Obler,
Insurance for Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1976);
Comment, Public Policy Prohibits Insurance Indemnification Against Awards of
Punitive Damages, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 944 (1963); Note, Exemplary Damages in
the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517 (1957); Comment, Insurer's Liability for
Punitive Damages, 14 Mo. L. REV. 175 (1949); Comment, Insurance Coverage
and the Punitive Damage Award in the Automobile Accident Case, 19 U. PITI'. L.
REV. 144 (1957); Comment, Punitive Damages and Their Possible Application in
Automobile Accident Litigation, 46 VA. L. REV. 1036 (1960). But see Lentz,
Payment of Punitive Damages by Insurance Companies, 15 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV.
313 (1966); Note, Automobile Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages, 20
S.C.L. REV. 71 (1968).
116. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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and deterrence, would seem to require that the damages rest
ultimately as well as nominally on the party actually
responsible for the wrong. If that person were permitted to
shift the burden to an insurance company, punitive damages
would serve no useful purpose. Such damages do not
compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory
damages already have made the plaintiff whole. And there
is no point in punishing the insurance company; it has done
no wrong. In actual fact, of course, and considering the
extent to which the public is insured, the burden would
ultimately come to rest not on the insurance companies but
on the public, since the added liability to the insurance
companies would be passed along to the premium payers.
Society would then be punishing itself for the wrong
committed by the insured.1l7
Judge Chasanow's analysis of the cases holding that public
policy does not exclude insuring against punitive damages indicated
to the circuit court that "almost all" of the cases could be
distinguished from the one at bar, either because they involved
"gross negligence" or something less than intentional acts, or
because the punitive damages were imposed as a result of vicarious
rather than direct liability.ll8
Discussing the distinction ·between vicarious and direct liability
coverage,119 the trial judge, citing Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Welfare Finance Coy2!J and Sterling Insurance Co. v. Hughes,121
noted that where punitive damages have been imposed on the
insured solely as the result of vicarious liability, the great weight of
authority is that insurance coverage of such damages does not
violate public policy.122 This is true even though many ofthose same
authorities also imply that their results might have been different
had the insured participated in, authorized, or ratified the tortious
conduct of its agents, employees, or other persons for whom it was

117. Id. at 440.
118. Record at 19.
119. Because it held that the trial judge had not erred in holding that liability was
direct rather than vicarious, the Court of Appeals did not need to draw a
distinction between the public policy considerations concerning a punitive award
assessed against one found vicariously liable and one found directly liable and
therefore did not even mention the distinction. In light of the court's holding
concerning insurance coverage in a direct liability situation, however, it is quite
likely that the Maryland court would fmd coverage afforded in a vicarious
liability situation.
120. 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
121. 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
122. See, e.g.,Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968);
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295
U.S. 734 (1935); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 261 So. 2d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1972). Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966);
Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 307 S.W.2d (Ky. App. 1974).
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vicariously responsible. 123 Finding that authority persuasive, the
trial judge stated that "the weight of authority and logic" compelled
the court to hold that where punitive damages are based on vicarious
liability no public policy is violated by allowing insurance coverage. 124
Further distinguishing cases that uphold insurance coverage of
punitive awards, the court noted that three of the leading cases 125
allowing insurance coverage for punitive damages deal with
punitive damages imposed for gross negligence in auto accidents,
"which may involve different considerations than in the instant
case, where punitive damages were imposed for an intentional
tort."126 The trial court stated that the only case of which it was
aware that had considered the public policy question of insurance
coverage for a punitive damages award against a corporation had
not indicated whether the corporation's liability was imposed
because of corporate acts or under the theory of respondeat
superior. 127 The court noted that persuasive arguments could be
made that because a corporation can act only through its agents, it
can only act vicariously and, therefore, should always be able to

123. See, e.g., Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Reichard, 404 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1968);
Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
295 U.S. 734 (1935); Sterling Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972).
124. Record at 22.
125. Price v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522 (1972);
Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582
(1969); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1
(1964).
126. Record at 20, quoting from Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246
Ark. 849, 852, 440 S.W.2d 582, 584 (1969) ("Neither can we find anything in the
State's public policy that prevents an insurer from indemnifying its insured
against punitive damages arising out of an accident, as distinguished from
intentional torts."). Another case, Colson v. Lloyds of London, 435 S.W.2d 42
(Mo. App. 1968), was distinguished because the court in that case held that it was
not against public policy for police officers to insure themselves against the
assessment of punitive damages for willful and intentional acts such as false
arrest, but in doing so the court emphasized the negative effect that a contrary
public policy would have on the recruitment of qualified police officers. Record at
20.
127. Record at 22. In Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d
124 (1969), the corporation had been found liable for punitive damages "for
willful and wanton misconduct," and the appellate court, without indicating
whether liability had been imposed because of corporate acts or under the theory
of respondeat superior, simply stated,
the appellant filed a supplemental list of authorities, which pertain to
the right of an individual tortfeasor to insure himself against liability for
his own acts. We have already noted that several jurisdictions arrive at
various rules of law in that situation. This case is different, it involves
only the right of a corporation to insure against liability caused by its
agents or servants. There is no reasonable basis to declare the latter type
of insurance is against public policy.
105 Ill. App. 2d at 137, 245 N.E.2d at 126.
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insure itself as an entity against punitive damages because of acts
committed by its agents.128 Similarly, it could be argued, since the
ultimate burden of a punitive award falls on a corporation's
shareholders, corporations should be freely allowed to protect their
shareholders by insurance. 129
The court believed, however, that those arguments failed to
consider that where an employer authorizes, ratifies, or participates
in an act of an employee, the employer is directly liable for punitive
damages assessed as a result of the employee's actYlO It would
therefore seem that an employer should not escape the full economic
impact of that basic principle merely by incorporating. 13l Further,
punitive damages are often assessed as a result of a deliberately
established corporate policy, not simply because of vicarious
liability. 132
Judge Chasanow believed that a number of abhorrent situations
could easily be imagined in which a corporation, in an attempt to
reap economic benefits, might adopt a policy of deliberate misrepresentation or of deliberate violation of the rights of others. In such
situations he expected that the threat of punitive damages would be
an effective deterrent, but only if the corporate policy makers know
that insurance would not cover such damages. 133 Accordingly, the
court observed that "[t]o always allow a corporation to escape,
through insurance, a punitive damage award for deliberate corporate
acts would seem violative of public policy."134 The circuit court found
the issue in the instant case comparable to a situation in which a
corporation is found guilty of a crime and sentenced to a fine,135 and
it noted that an insurance policy permitting the insured to recover
the amount of fines imposed for a violation of a criminal law would
clearly be against public policy.13s Based upon the foregoing
analysis, the circuit court held,
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Record at 22.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra.
Record at 22-23.
Id. at 23. See, e.g., Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972)
(award of punitive damages against a loan corporation for invasion of privacy
allowed where court found sufficient evidence to show that corporation had
deliberate and persistent policy to harass debtor and iritimidate her into
repaying loan); GAl Audio of New York, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc., 27 Md. App. 172, 340 A.2d 736 (1975).
133. For an analysis of such a rationale, see Obler, Insurance for Punitive Damages:
A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431, 466-74 (1976).
134. Record at 23.
135. Id. (noting that according to 10 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS
§ 4942 at 67 (1963, Supp. 1976) the general rule appears to be that a corporation
may be held criminally responsible for the illegal acts of its employees if such
acts are "(1) related to and committed within the course of employment; (2)
committed in furtherance of the business of the corporation; and (3) authorized or
acquiesced in by the corporation.").
136. Record at 23-24 (citing 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance § 241 (1969) and 44 C.J.S.
Insurance § 242 (1945».
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that where a corporation is held liable for punitive damages,
and an insurance policy is in 'effect which covers punitive
damages, the insurer is liable for the amount of the punitive
damages unless the insurer can show it would be against
public policy for the corporation to shift the penalty to the
insurer. This could be done by showing that the corporation
through its officers, directors, etc., authorized, or ratified the
act that gave rise to the punitive damages. 137
In the instant case, it was clear to the court that the insurer had
met its burden and established that the corporation, its insured, was
directly, rather than vicariously, liable for the punitive damages
imposed against it for the malicious prosecution of Mrs. Todd.
Accordingly, public policy precluded insuring against the punitive
damages awarded against the Bank.

B.

The Court of Appeals Opinion

The circuit court's decision was appealed by the plaintiff
Bank. 13B The central issue on appeal was whether the circuit court
had been correct in holding that the public policy of Maryland would
not allow for insurance coverage of the punitive damages assessed
against the Bank. 139

137. Record at 24.
138. ld. The Bank had appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and the Court of
Appeals granted the Bank's petition for a writ of certiorari prior to argument in
the Court of Special Appeals.
139. The Bank had also asserted that the trial court was in error in holding that the
Bank's liability in the Todd case was direct rather than vicarious. See text
accompanying notes 125-37 supra. Pointing out that the Bank had overlooked
the written stipulation of facts the parties entered into in the case, the Court of
Appeals quickly disposed of the Bank's argument by holding that the circuit
court had not erred in determining that liability was direct rather than vicarious.
283 Md. at 231, 389 A.2d at 361.
The parties had stipulated as follows:
6. Counsel for Alma Todd wrote a letter to the First National Bank
of St. Mary's County outlining the defenses of Alma Todd and
requesting that the matter be handled civilly rather than through
criminal prosecution. After advice of counsel, it was the corporate
decision of the First National Bank of St. Mary's County to continue
with the criminal prosecution.
7. After consultation with counsel, the First National Bank of St.
Mary's County, as a matter of corporate policy, rejected the offers of
Alma Todd and made the corporate decision in the furtherance of the
business purposes of the corporation to prosecute Alma Todd.
ld. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added by court).
F & D also argued that the terms of the policy itself did not provide coverage
for exemplary damages but the Court of Appeals held that that issue was not
properly before it. The court, however, also concluded that had the issue been
properly preserved for review, it would have held that the circuit court had not
erred in determining that the policy terms covered punitive damages assess·
ments. ld. See text accompanying note 98 supra.
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Noting that Mrs. Todd's action against the Bank and its
employee was for malicious prosecution, the majority acknowledged
that the Court of Appeals had previously stated that punitive
damages were properly recoverable in such an action if a jury found
"a want of probable cause."140 Writing for the majority, Judge Smith
then pointed out that in one of its latest pronouncements concerning
punitive damages 141 the court had stated that exemplary damages
"are awarded, over and above all compensation, to punish the
wrongdoer, to teach him not to repeat his wrongful conduct and to
deter others from engaging in the same conduct."142 According to the
majority, it is from such statements that the public policy
argument is constructed, that if the wrongdoer may have someone
else bear the expense of paying such an assessment, the deterrent
effect is lost. 143 Pointing out that a large number of cases involve
claims arising from auto accidents, the court acknowledged that
there is a split of authority as to whether it is against public policy to
provide insurance coverage for punitive damages. 144

140. 283 Md. at 232, 389 A.2d at 361 (quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md.
168, 177, 122 A.2d 457, 462 (1956». For other cases discussing punitive damages
awards in malicious prosecution actions, see Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705 (1975); D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Brooks,
264 Md. 578, 278 A.2d 251 (1972).
141. Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976).
142. 283 Md. at 232,389 A.2d at 361 (quoting Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md.
524, 531, 336 A.2d 7, 12 (1976».
143. 283 Md. at 232, 389 A.2d at 361. The dissent emphasized that prior case law
mandated such a conclusion:
If we assume, as our prior case law says we must, that the goals of
punishing and deterring extreme and outrageous behavior are subserved
by allowing punitive damages in appropriate cases, it follows inexorably
that the burden of the penalty so assessed must be borne exclusively by
the culpable party. The risk of such a loss thus cannot, consistent with
the theory behind exemplary damage awards, be shifted to a third party,
be it a surety, an insurance company or the public at large.
283 Md. at 246, 389 A.2d at 368 (citing Butler v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 265 Or.
473, 509 P.2d 1184 (1973».
144. The court noted that cases holding against such coverage include American Sur.
Co. of New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966) (applying Kansas law);
Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962) (applying
Virginia and Florida law); Ging v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 756
(N.D. Fla. 1968) (applying Florida law); Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York
v. Reichard, 262 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Fla. 1966) (applying Florida law); American
Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965) (applying Connecticut law);
Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941); Crull v. Gleb,
382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. App. 1964); Newark v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 134
N.J. Super. 537, 342 A.2d 513 (App. Div. 1975); LoRocco v. New Jersey Mfrs.
Indem. Ins. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (App. Div. 1964); and Esmond v.
Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
Cases holding that public policy does not bar insurance coverage of punitive
awards include Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Title Guarantee Co., 520 F.2d 1170 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 108 Ariz. 485, 502 P.2d 522
(1972); Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849,440 S.W.2d
582 (1969); Greenwood Cemetery v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 238 Ga. 313, 232 S.E.2d
910 (1977); Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,
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Recognizing Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty145
as the leading case denying coverage on public policy grounds,146 the
court, as had the trial judge, quoted what has come to be the legal
touchstone for denying coverage on public policy grounds. 147 Stating
that Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance CO.148 is the
"premier case" holding insurance coverage for exemplary damages
not barred by public policy,149 Judge Smith quoted as well from the
Lazenby opinion:
We accept, as common knowledge, the fact death and
injuries on our highways and streets is a very serious
problem and such is a matter ·of great public concern. We
further accept, as common knowledge, socially irresponsible
drivers, who by their actions in operation of motor vehicles,
could be liable for punitive damages are a great part of this
problem. We, however, are not able to agree the closing of
the insurance market, on the payment of punitive damages,
to such drivers would necessarily accomplish the result of
deterring them in their wrongful conduct. This State, in
regard to the proper operation of motor vehicles, has a great
many detailed criminal sanctions, which apparently have
not deterred this slaughter on our highways and streets.
Then to say the closing of the insurance market, in the
payment of punitive damages, would act to deter guilty
drivers would in our opinion contain some element of
speculation. ISO
Judge Smith then noted that the following observations from the
majority opinion in Harrell v. Travelers Indemnity CO.151 also
applied to the instant case:
[T]his case does not involve the application of any settled
and established rule of contract 'public policy,' but the
adoption in Oregon of a proposed new rule of 'public policy'
under which both existing and future insurance contracts
which undertake to provide protection from liability for
punitive damages would be held to be invalid.
It has been said of 'public policy' as a ground for
invalidation by the courts of private contracts that "those

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d
146 (Ky. 1974); Colson v. Lloyd's of London, 435 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1968);
Harrell v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); and Lazenby
v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962). See text accompany notes 116-18 supra.
283 Md. at 233, 389 A.2d at 362.
See text accompanying note 117 supra.
214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964). See text accompanying notes 67-73 supra.
283 Md. at 234, 389 A.2d at 363.
214 Tenn. at 647, 383 S.W.2d at 5.
279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977).
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two alliterative words are often used as if they had a magic
quality and were self explanatory ... " and that for a court
to undertake to invalidate private contracts upon the ground
of 'public policy' is to mount "a very unruly horse, and when
you once get astride it you never know where it will carry
yoU."152
Other statements in Harrell were also found by the F & D
majority to be apropos. As one example of what it considered could
be the unfortunate result if insurance coverage against punitive
damages were held against public policy, the Harrell court had said,
The owner of a retail store who causes the arrest and
prosecution of a suspected shoplifter under circumstances
not sufficient to constitute "probable cause" may also have
an uninsurable liability for punitive damages because the
jury may make a finding of malice based upon lack of
probable cause.
Under the rule proposed by the defendant, and as held
by the trial court, even though the risks involved in each of
these examples were of such a nature as to be encountered in
the operation of such business or professions, and the
conduct involved did not involve "intentionally inflicted
injury," any contract with an insurance company to provide
protection against the risk of punitive damages as the result
of such conduct would become invalid as a matter of "public
policy," regardless of whether the insurance contract was
negotiated upon payment of an additional premium for
protection against such liability.153
The Harrell court observed that it is naive to hold an insurance
contract covering punitive damages invalid as contrary to public
policy on the grounds that such coverage would result in punishment
to the insurer or society as a whole. The Harrell majority emphasized
the right of an insurance company to contract as it saw fit:
[A]n insurance company which deliberately enters into a
contract to provide coverage against liability for punitive
damages is free to charge either a separate or additional
premium for that risk. Conversely, if an insurance contract
excludes coverage for liability against punitive damages no
such additional premium need be charged and the insurance
company may charge a lower premium for such a policy.154
152. 279 Or. at 209-10, 567 P.2d at 1016 (quoting 6A A. CORBIN CONTRACTS § 1375 at
10 (1962) and 14 S. WILLISTON, LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1629, at 7-8 (3d ed. 1972».
(footnotes omitted).
153. 279 Or. at 210-11, 567 P.2d at 1018-19 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
154. Id.
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The Oregon court had pointed out that alternatives such as
elimination of punitive damages, limitations on amounts of punitive
awards, or limiting liability to such flagrant misconduct as
intentionally inflicted injury, might be preferable to the thenexisting law in Oregon but noted that such "possible alternatives
might more appropriately be considered by the legislature, rather
than by the COUrts."I55 Judge Smith believed that the same
comments could be made relative to Maryland. I56
The F & D court summarized the Harrell dissent by quoting the
following statement:
The purpose of compensatory damages is to compensate,
and this purpose is carried out no matter who is held
ultimately responsible for payment. The purpose of punitive
damages, on the other hand, is to deter, and this purpose is
not carried out if the one who ultimately pays is an insurer
rather than the wrongdoer.I57
Though finding that the McNulty opinion and Harrell dissent
have a "theoretical, intellectual"158 appeal, the majority stated that
that appeal fades materially when the problem is surveyed "in
practical terms looking at certain bench marks for guidance."159
Conducting that survey, the majority found guidance for its decision
in a century-old statement made in Estate of Woods, Weeks & CO.:I60
[T]he right of parties to contract as they please is
restricted only by a few well defmed and well settled rules,
and it must be a very plain case to justify a court in holding
a contract to be against public policy. It must be a case in
which the common sense of the entire community would so
pronounce it.I61

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 216, 567 P.2d at 1021.
283 Md. at 237, 389 A.2d at 364.
279 Or. at 229-30, 567 P.2d at 1028.
283 Md. at 238, 389 A.2d at 364.
Id.
52 Md. 520 (1879). Judge Levine in dissent said the majority's reliance upon that
case controvenes the principle of stare decisis and "abandon[s] controlling
authority barely two months old in favor of . . . outmoded and patently
inadequate precedent." 283 Md. at 244-45 n.2, 389 A.2d at 368 n.2.
161. 52 Md. at 536. In Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Comm'n v.
Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216 (1978), Judge Levine
observed that "[e]nforcement [of contract provisions] will be denied only where
the factors that argue against implementing the particular provision clearly and
unequivocally outweigh 'the law's traditional interest in protecting the
expectations of the parties, its abhorrence of any unjust enrichment, and any
public interest in the enforcement' of the contested term." Id. at 607, 386 A.2d at
1229 (citation omitted).
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Having thus set the :tone for his further discussion of public
policy considerations, Judge Smith pointed out the cautious
approach to be taken by a court when making public policy.
determinations, by quoting from Patton v. United States: 162
The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a
doctrine of vague and variable quality and, unless deducible
in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory
provisions, should be accepted as the basis of a judicial
determination, if at alL only with the utmost circumspection.
The public policy of one generation may not, under changed
conditions, be the public policy of another.163
Noting again that the legislature is the normal policy-declaring
department of the government,164 the court stated that "when the
General Assembly has desired to forbid protection by insurance from
the equivalent of exemplary damages, it has done so explicitly."165
The court found that the only instance in which the General
Assembly had seen fit to make a pronouncement on the subject was
with regard to claims in. workmen's compensation cases where a
statute provides that wh~n doubled payments are awarded against
the employer to an illegally employed minor, his employer cannot be
indemnified by insurance for the extra punitive part of the award. 16S
The court reached the:heart of the decision after listing contracts
which it had "no doubt that the common sense of the entire
community . . . would in each instance pronounce . . . void as

162. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
163. 281 U.S. at 306. The Court of Appeals also quoted from W. BRANTLEY, LAW OF
CONTRACT (2d ed. 1922) where that text discusses agreements contrary to public
policy: "Another element Of uncertainity in the application of this principle is
that the popular, and consequently the judicial view of what is right and wrong,
fair and unfair, changes and varies in a silent and unconscious growth. What
one generation deems fair and right is in the mores of age, and another
generation may deem it wrong, and that makes it wrong." Id. at 220-21 (footnote
omitted).
164. 283 Md. at 239, 389 A.2d' at 365 (citing 4 S. WILLISTON, LAw OF CONTRACTS
§ 1629A at 4558 n.4 (rev. ed. S. Williston & G. Thompson 1937». See also text
accompanying note 156 supra.
165. 283 Md. at 239, 389 A.2d at 365.
166. Id. at 243, 389 A.2d at 367. Section 47 of the Maryland Workmen's Compensation
Act, MD. ANN. CODE art. 101 (Supp. 1978) states in part: "All compensation and
death benefits provided by this article, however, may be doubled in the discretion
of the Commission in the case of any minor employed illegally under the laws of
this State, and no insurance policy shall be available to protect the employer of
such minor from the payment of the extra or additional compensation or benefits
to be awarded by reason of 'such illegal employment, but the employer alone shall
be liable for the said increased amounts of compensation or death benefits."
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against public policy."167 Then determining that the common sense
of the community would in fact demand that punitive damages
assessed against a small businessman be satisfied through the
insurance for which he paid, the court observed,
If we were to hold that F & D was barred by public
policy from paying the exemplary damages assessed against
the Bank and thus that it had to be paid by the stockholders
of the Bank, such a holding would have implications far
beyond this case, as was pointed out forcefully in Harrell. It
would be equally applicable to the small businessman who
has attempted to protect his business by purchasing various
. types of liability insurance. If we were to determine that it is
against public policy for one to protect himself by insurance
against exemplary damages, such a small businessman
could be crippled or virtually wiped out by an assessment of
exemplary damages in a malicious prosecution action where
he proceeded with what he regarded as good reason to
prosecute a shoplifter but the courts found that he lacked
probable cause for such pursuit. The same would be true of
the small businessman who is angered at being given a bad
check for a past due account and then proceeds to swear out
a warrant for the arrest of that individual, not being
cognizant of the fact that to constitute a violation of our
statute there must be a present consideration. It is not an
adequate answer' to such concerns to say that the trier of
fact assessing such damages had before it the net worth of
the offending party, because insofar as many small business
people are concerned that new worth will to a large degree be
composed of their home and the stock in trade or other
assets of their business. We suspect that in such situations
the common sense of the entire community would not
construe such insurance contracts to be against public
policy. In fact, we strongly suspect that the common sense of
the community as a whole would expect a judgment

167. 283 Md. at 240, 389 A.2d at 365 (referring to Estate of Woods, Weeks & Co., 52
Md. 520 (1879». As examples of such contracts, the court listed
... agreements having a tendency to obstruct or interfere with the
administration of justice, or to injure public service; contracts clearly
repugnant to sound morality, such as contracts based on illicit
association or intercourse; agreements to commit a crime or to reward
one for the commission of a crime or for the suppression or compounding
of a crime; agreements to wrong or defraud third persons; and contract
provisions for immunity from bad faith or fraud, . . . contracts which
aid the enemy or operate to the disadvantage of the country in time of
war; ... those for rewards for the arrest of persons where the arrest
would. be illegal; a sham agreement intended to enable one party to
reduce his tax liability; contracts involving the unlawful practice of law;
and contracts not within the powers conferred on banks and which
jeopardize the safety of bank deposits.
283 Md. at 240, 389 A.2d at 365 (citations omitted).
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including exemplary damages to be satisfied through the
insurance policies for which such small business people
have paid. It would be outraged and have substantial
difficulty in comprehending the reasons for a holding to the
contrary.168
Countering the contention that permitting payment of punitive
damages by an insurance company eliminates deterrence, the court
noted that deterrence of wrondgoing would be prompted by the
potential wrongdoer's knowledge that persons who are shown by
experience to be poor risks encounter difficulty in obtaining
insurance I69 or may become subject to policies written with
retrospective premiums where the premium is computed after losses
are determined. 170
Finally, the court stated that in the past insurance companies
have not shown reluctance to write restrictions in their own best
interests into insurance policies; yet no such restriction was included
in the F & D policy. The majority stated that in the fourteen years
since Lazenb y l71 insurers surely were cognizant of the fact that they
might be called upon to pay punitive awards and "probably have
considered such a possibility in establishing rates."172
Therefore, having found "not the slightest suggestion of a
'constitutional or statutory provision' from which a public policy
against payment is deducible,"173 the court held that the common
sense of the entire community would not pronounce it against public
policy for F & D to pay the judgment for exemplary damages
assessed against the Bank. 174

C. The Dissent
Judge Levine began his analytical dissent by stating that,
Swayed by what it terms "practical" considerations, the
majority ... has sub silentio dealt a death blow to the
theory of exemplary damages applied in Maryland for well
over a century.175

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

283 Md. at 241, 389 A.2d at 366 (citation omitted).
Id. at 242, 389 A.2d at 366.
Id.
Lazenby v. Universal Underwriter Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
283 Md. at 243, 389 A.2d at 362. But see text accompanying notes 217-33 infra.
Id. (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930».
Id.
283 Md. at 243-44, 389 A.2d at 367 (footnote omitted). Judge Levine noted that
"although punitive damages have been recognized by the common law since the
mid·eighteenth century, Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 207 (K.B. 1763), the first
Maryland decision expressly recognizing the doctrine was handed down in 1857.
Gaither v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536, 552-53 (1857)." 283 Md. at 244 n.l, 389 A.2d at
367 n.!.
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Referring to the court's responsibility to balance carefully the public
and private interests in determining whether to enforce a contractual provision asserted to be void as against public policy,176 the
dissent found that among those factors that militate against
enforcement of such a contract provision are the strength of the
public policy as manifested by either legislation or judicial decisions
and the likelihood that a refusal to enforce the disputed term will
further the policy.177 Since punitive damages, as distinguished from
compensatory or nominal damages, are awarded "to punish
reprehensible and outrageous conduct and to set an example which
will serve to deter the wrongdoer and others from engaging in such
conduct in the future,"178 it was Judge Levine's opinion that these
policies weighed against enforcement of the insurance contract
provision at hand, and could be promoted only by denying
enforcement of insurance agreements that indemnify adjudicated
intentional tort-feasors against punitive awards. "A contrary result
... would in practical effect, be tantamount to abolishing punitive
damages altogether."179 Assuming, as Judge Levine found prior case
law required, that the goals of punishing and deterring extreme and
outrageous behavior are subserved by allowing punitive damages in
appropriate cases, the dissent determined that,
Logic therefore demands that individuals or enterprises
directly responsible for the commission of outrageous
injurious acts be prohibited from escaping the impact of an
award of exemplary damages through the simple expedient
of purchasing liability insurance. l80

176. 283 Md. at 244, 389 A.2d at 367 (quoting Maryland-National Capital Park and
Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'l Arena, 282 Md. 588, 607, 386 A.2d 1216,
1229 (1978»:
Enforcement will be denied only where the factors that argue against
implementing the particular provision clearly and unequivocally
outweigh the law's traditional interest in protecting the expectations of
the parties, its abhorrence of any unjust enrichment, and any public
interest in the enforcement of the contested term.
177. 283 Md. at 244, 389 A.2d at 367 (citing Maryland·National Capital Park and
Planning Comm'n v. Washington Nat'! Arena, 282 Md. 588, 386 A.2d 1216
(1978».
178. 283 Md. at 245, 389 A.2d at 368 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md.
627, 638, 381 A.2d 16, 22 (1977) and citing Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278
Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9
at 205 (1973». The dissent also noted that aside from punishment and deterrence,
punitive damages may serve to channel a plaintiffs anger from retaliating
against a defendant or may simply reflect social outrage apart from any
remedial purpose. 283 Md. at 245-46 n.3, :389 A.2d at 368 n.3 (citinJ{ Harrell v.
Traveler's Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977) (Linde, J., dissenting)
and Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Law, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1l9H (1931».
179. 283 Md. at 245, 389 A.2d at 368.
180. Id. at 246, 389 A.2d at 368.
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Judge Levine found that the majority's argument in favor of
permitting insurance for punitive damages liability, when reduced to
its essentials, "is founded on a noble but rather misplaced solicitude
for the economic well-being of small businessmen."181 Arguing
against the majority's position in that regard, the dissent pointed
out that punitive damages may be awarded only when "the tortious
conduct can be described as extreme or outrageous, similar to that
usually found in crime."182 Accordingly, when even a small
businessman's conduct is so reprehensible that he exposes himself to
the risk of liability for damages in excess of those necessary to
compensate his victim, he is entitled to no more or less protection
than others who commit acts of a similar kind deserving the
imposition of punitive damages:
Even though financial disaster may be the immediate
consequence of a punitive damage award, there is no
injustice in the eyes of the law, provided the punishment
exacted reasonably corresponds to the gravity of the tortious
conduct involved. 183
The dissent next addressed the troublesome fact that only in
malicious prosecution actions is it possible for a plaintiff to recover
punitive damages, even though viewed objectively, the defendant's
conduct is not truly extreme or outrageous. Judge Levine noted that
whenever a defendant is found guilty of malicious prosecution,
punitive damages may be awarded 184 on the theory that the malice
necessary to support the punitive award is an element of the tort
itself.185 Further, though malice must be shown in order to support a
malicious prosecution action,186 that malice need not be proved
separately but may be inferred from want of probable cause on the
part of the defendant. 187 And, based on that inferrence, punitive
damages may be recovered. 188 In Judge Levine's opinion, however,
"a finding that a defendant instituted criminal proceedings against
the plaintiff based on something less than probable cause does not
necessarily mean that the defendant's conduct in this regard was
either extreme or outrageous."189 In his view, such an aberration in

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 247, 389 A.2d at 369.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 248, 389 A.2d at 369 (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168,
122 A.2d 457 (1956».
.
Id. (citing Siegman v. Equitable Trust Co., 267 Md. 309, 297 A.2d 758 (1972».
Id. (citing Cecil v. Clarke, 17 Md. 508 (1861».
Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978».
Id. (citing Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 340 A.2d 705
(1975».
Id. at 248, 389 A.2d at 369-70.
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the law of damages did not allow the majority to "justify a broadsweeping rule allowing persons to insure themselves against
punitive damage awards in all tort cases where such damages are
otherwise available."l90 The better approach to such a situation
would be to modify the present law by requiring a higher degree of
offensiveness as a prerequisite to punitive damages recovery in
malicious prosecution actions, thereby assuring that punitive
damages would be assessed in all tort actions according to a uniform
standard of culpability and would comport with the punitive and
deterrent function of such awards. 191 An alternative, though less
desirable, course of action would be to permit parties to insure
against punitive damages only in those malicious prosecution
actions in which liability is predicated upon implied malice.192
Judge Levine noted that the deterrent function of punitive
damages should not be overestimated. For example, one acting out of
anger or hate in commiting an assault is unlikely to be deterred by
fear of punitive damages. He believed, on the other hand, that a tortfeasor engaging in intentional misconduct pursuant to a well defined
corporate policy would be more likely to pause and consider the
consequences if aware that his wrongdoing may expose him to
punitive liability.193 He disagreed, however, with the majority's
suggestion that the deterrent effect of punitive damages will be
preserved because tort-feasors found to be poor risks will have
difficulty in obtaining insurance. Judge Levine felt that though poor
risks may be required to pay higher premiums, an increase in
premium rates spread over a number of months, probably tax
deductible, would be far less effective as a deterrent than the threat
of sudden and severe economic loss caused by a lump sum judgment
for which the defendant is solely responsible. 194
Finally, the dissent addressed the majority's reliance upon the
fact that the General Assembly had not acted to prohibit insurers
from providing liability coverage against punitive damages awards.
Stating that public policy is not derived exclusively from constitutional provisions and legislative enactments as the majority
indicated, it was Judge Levine's opinion that where the controversy
centers around the application of a common law doctrine such as
punitive damages, the fact that the legislature has not intervened
indicated that it was willing to allow the courts to continue to control
the evolution of the law. Accordingly, the proper application of
judicially defmed policies dealing with punitive damages was

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

[d. at 248, 389 A.2d at 370.
[d. at 248-49, 389 A.2d at 370.
[d. at 248, 389 A.2d at 370.
[d. at 249 n.5, 389 A.2d at 370 n.5.
[d. at 249, 389 A.2d at 370.
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squarely within the competence of the court to resolve and, therefore,
in the dissent's opinion, the court should have held that insurance
against liability for punitive damages offended the public policy of
this state. 195

V. A REVIEW
The opinion rendered by the majority of the F & D court leaves
unanswered some questions concerning the scope and the applicability of the court's holding to future cases involving the issue of
insurance coverage for punitive damages and, possibly, even to
cases dealing with the initial question of whether a punitive award
may be assessed against a defendant himself.
Judge Levine may have been correct in his assessment of the
majority's treatment of the theoretical basis for imposition of
punitive damages in Maryland when he stated that the court had
"sub silentio dealt a death blow to the theory of exemplary damages
applied in Maryland [in a] radical transformation of the law of
punitive damages."196 The Court of Appeals, for well over a century,
has stated and reiterated the basic premise that punitive damages
are awarded to punish and to deter reprehensible conduct. 197 The F &
D majority acknowledged that rationale at the outset. of its
opinion. 198 The court, however, went on to conclude that the
"theoretical, intellectual" appeal of opinions from other courts,
which had determined that the deterrent effect of punitive damages
would be lost if an insurer instead of the tort-feasor pays the
exemplary award, faded when examined from a practical viewpoint.199 That "practical" view, however, focused on the theoretical
potential for financial harm, which the majority opined could befall a
small businessman 200 if he were to be the subject of a large punitive
award. The majority, moreover, did not directly address the dissent's
argument that a small businessman who is guilty of extreme and
outrageous conduct should be entitled to no more or less solicitude
than any other defendant who has committed reprehensible acts if
the punishment imposed reasonably corresponds to the enormity of

195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 250, 389 A.2d at 371.
Id. at 243-44, 389 A.2d at 367.
See, e.g., note 10 supra.
283 Md. at 232, 389 A.2d at 361 (citing Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md.
524, 366 A.2d 712 (1976)).
199. 283 Md. at 238, 389 A.2d at 364.
200. Id. at 241, 389 A.2d at 366; see text accompanying note 168 supra. In dissent
Judge Levine observed,
The majority's preoccupation with the plight of the small business
community is somewhat surprising considering the fact that the
tortfeasor in this case is one of southern Maryland's leading banking
institutions and thus hardly qualifies as a small business.
Id. at 247 n.4. 389 A.2d at 369 n.4.
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the tortious conduct. Instead, inferentially acknowledging that a
jury evaluating a punitive claim may be presented with evidence of a
defendant's fmancial standing, 20 1 the court expressed its concern
that a small businessman may be "crippled or virtually wiped out by
an assessment of exemplary damages,"202 stating:
It is not an adequate answer to such concerns to say that the
trier of fact assessing such damages has before it the net
worth of the offending party, because insofar as many small
business people are concerned that net worth will, to a large
degree, be composed of their home and the stock in trade or
other assets of their business.203
Not addressed, however, were past pronouncements that punitive
awards should be tailored to both the enormity of the act and the
particular circumstances of the actor.204 In light of such statements,
the majority could have acknowledged even more readily, and more
consistently with past pronouncements, that once the small
businessman's net worth has been introduced into evidence, he
should be allowed to offer countervailing evidence to explain his
financial status in an attempt to mitigate against an enormous
award. The ability to present such evidence would allow the
defendant the opportunity to convince a jury that any exemplary
award should be only punitive; not ruinous. F~iling in that
endeavor, such a presentation by the defendant nonetheless gives
him the opportunity to lay the groundwork to request an order of
remittitur should the jury return an excessive punitive verdict. 205
Perhaps the majority was correct when it posited the negative
statement that,
It can not properly be said that permitting payment of
exemplary damages by an insurance company eliminates
deterrence, notwithstanding the fact that the loss is thus
spread across a number of policy holders through the
payment of premiums ... because those who are demonstrated by experience to be poor risks encounter substantial
difficulty in obtaining insurance, a fact such persons
know. 206
201.
202.
203.
204.

See text accompanying notes 53-54 supra.
283 Md. at 241, 389 A.2d at 366.

Id.
See Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423,429-31, 24 A.2d 917, 921 (1942); Sloan v.

Edwards, 61 Md. 89, 100 (1883); Gaither v. Blowers, 11 Md. 536, 542 (1857).
205. Ct. Kneas v. Hecht Co., 257 Md. 121, 262 A.2d 518 (1970) (after defendant's
motion for judgment n.o.v. on punitive damages was granted, new trial was
ordered unless plaintiff agreed to remittitur on compensatory damages); Turner
v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 221 Md. 494, 158 A.2d 125 (.1960)
(defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. was granted and trial court ordered new
trial unless remittitur was accepted by plaintiff).
206. 283 Md. at 242, 389 A.2d at 366.
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Yet, it is difficult to fault the logic of Judge Levine's statement that
such minimal deterrence is hardly comparable to the deterrent effect
which might be gained by the knowledge that the defendant may be
solely responsible for a large lump sum punitive judgment. 207
It seems clear that as Judge Levine said in his dissent, "[w]hat
troubles the majority is the fact that in malicious prosecution actions
(and in those cases alone), it is possible under existing Maryland law
for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages even though the
defendant's conduct, objectively viewed, is not truly extreme or
outrageous."208 Writing for the majority, Judge Smith placed
significant emphasis on the fact that the underlying cause of action
for which punitive damages had been awarded in the instant case
had been the tort of malicious prosecution.209 That fact made the
case an unfortunate vehicle by which to deal with the question of
insurance coverage for punitive damages because of the nature of
the proof of malice that may be established to support a punitive
award for that tort.210
Judge Levine's statement that the court had dealt a death blow
to the theory of punitive damages may be of only academic, not
practical, import. The majority did acknowledge the punitive/deterrent rationale of punitive damages and did not overtly stray from
that rationale, instead taking pains to opine that the deterrent effect
would be subserved through the inability of a wrongdoer to obtain
insurance. 211 Further, even if one assumes that the rationale
underlying punitive awards has been altered by F & D, the fact that
the case dealt with the tort of malicious prosecution may readily
provide the basis for limiting the impact of the decision to actions
dealing only with that tort. Accordingly, it is appropriate to assume
at this juncture that the court's opinion will have significant
practical effect only upon the narrower issues involving insurance
coverage for punitive damages.
Whether Judge Levine was correct when he made the sweeping
statement that the majority had built upon the anomaly of malicious
prosecution law a broad-sweeping rule allowing persons to insure
themselves against punitive damages awards in all tort cases where
such damages are otherwise available 212 cannot yet be determined.
Given the court's public policy holding and its apparent approval of
the trial court's policy construction analysis, however, it appears
that those standard liability policies presently in force that afford

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 249, 389 A.2d at 370; see text accompanying notes 193-94 supra.
Id. at 247-48, 389 A.2d at 369.
Id. at 241, 389 A.2d at 365-66.
See text accompanying notes 184-89 supra.
See text accompanying note 169 supra.
283 Md. at 248, 389 A.2d at 370.
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coverage to a Maryland insured would be held to afford coverage for
a punitive assessment for any wrong for which the policy provided
indemnity for a compensatory damages award. Though it would be
necessary to analyze the provisions of the individual policy in
question to determine the scope of its coverage, as a general
proposition it may be said that commercial policies carrying
endorsements affording coverage for malicious prosecution, defamation, and false imprisonment would be held to afford indemnity for
both compensatory and punitive awards. 213 While it may not be
possible to indemnify oneself against any damages assessed for
direct liability for such torts as assault or battery,214 it does appear
that the F & D public policy analysis combined with the trial court's
vicarious liability analysis would allow a business entity to insure
itself against liability for a punitive award based on an assault or
battery committed by one of its employees. 215 In fact, given the Court
of Appeals' public policy analysis, it is clear that in the case of a
punitive award against a business entity based solely upon a theory
of vicarious liability, the general rule followed in most, if not all,
jurisdictions that have considered the question 216 would pertain, and
the insured would be allowed to recover both the compensatory and
punitive damages assessment from his insurer unless specifically
precluded from doing so by the policy terms.
Although both the Court of Appeals and the lower court stressed
that F & D had not specifically excluded punitive damages from the
terms of its policy coverage,217 it is not clear that the insurer would
have been allowed by the Maryland state agency regulating
insurance matters to do so had it made the attempt. No Maryland
court, at least at the appellate level, had considered the question of
insurance coverage for punitive damages prior to the instant case,
and it does not appear that the Attorney General had rendered an
opinion on the matter. The issue, however, had been addressed at
least twice by the Maryland Insurance Commission, and both times
the Commission refused to give approval for the use of a punitive
damages exclusion endorsement to insurance policies.
In February, 1975, Northland Insurance Company requested
permission from the Insurance Commission to issue an endorsement
to its commercial automobile liability policies that would have stated
in part,

213. See First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 389
A.2d 359 (1978).
214. See generally R. LoNG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.16 (rev. perm. ed.
1978).
215. See First Nat'l Bank of St. Mary's v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 283 Md. 228, 241,
389 A.2d 359, 366 (1978).
216. See text accompanying notes 74-80 & 122 supra.
217. See text accompanying notes 109 & 172 supra.
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It is hereby agreed and understood, in consideration of the
premium charged, that damages, costs and expenses covered
under Insuring Agreements ... exclude punitive and/or
exemplary damages.

These Insuring Agreements and/or coverage parts are
limited to compensatory damages resulting strictly from
liability for the coverage as defined. 218
In support of its proposed endorsement, the insurance company
reasoned that most liability policies do not define damages within
the insuring agreement and generally do not exclude punitive
damages within the policy terms; consequently most courts construe
the policy language in such a fashion to hold the insurer responsible
for payment of all damages, including punitive damages. 219
Secondly, there was a large disparity among the states' laws and
regulations concerning insurance coverage for punitive damages,
and the carrier wished to clarify the distinction between compensatory and punitive awards. 220 The carrier stated that its liability rates
did not contemplate any coverage exposure for punitive awards, that
allowing indemnity for punitive awards would result in increased
rates being passed on to the insuring public, and shifting the burden
of punitive damages from the party responsible for the wrongful act
to an insurance company did not serve the purposes of such
damages, which were designed to punish. 221
Disapproving that request, the Insurance Commissioner stated,
1. No statistical evidence was included in your filing to
support your request for the amendment of coverage.

2. Under Florida and Virginia law, "punitive damages"
are punitory and deterrent. Maryland law, however, is not
quite as explicit and there is little case law on the subject.
Compensatory damages are generally defined as such as
arise from actual and indirect pecuniary loss, mental
suffering, value of time, actual expenses, and bodily pain
and suffering. Exemplary, vindictive or punitory damages
are such as blend together the interests of society and of the
aggrieved individual, and are not only a recompense to the
sufferer but also a punishment to the offender and an
example to the community.
It would appear that it would be more appropriate to
consider the nature of the conduct of the wrongdoer rather
218. Letter from Edwin M. Mitchell, Vice President & Assistant Secretary, Northland
Insurance Company to State of Maryland Department of Insurance (Feb. 19,
1975).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.

1979]

Punitive Damages

265

than the nature of the damages awarded. These, however,
are legal issues which are more appropriately the province of
our judicial system. 222
In 1977, the Insurance Commission again received a request for
permission to explicitly exclude punitive damages from insurance
policies. The Insurance Services Office of Maryland requested
permission to add the following endorsement to a number of types of
liability policies:
Regardless of any other provision of this policy, this policy
does not apply to punitive or exemplary damages. 223
Again denying permission to add an excluding endorsement, the
Insurance Commission reiterated much of the rationale of its denial
of the Northland request, and added that,
4. In a very broad sense, all awards under a tort liability
system could be interpreted as containing elements of
punitive damages.
5. It is necessary to consider the reasonable expectations of the insured. While claims may be made, there need
not be any real basis in fact for the claim and the insured
has the reasonable expectation of defense. 224
The F & D decision would appear to give the Insurance
Commission the authority that it had indicated previously it
believed it lacked to approve either endorsements excluding punitive
damages coverage or increased premium rates for coverage for such
damages. 225 It appears, however, that the Commission is going to be
very reluctant to allow the explicit exclusion of exemplary damages
coverage in policies issued in this state. 226
222. Letter from Thomas J. Hatem, Insurance Commissioner, to E. M. Mitchell (May
12, 1975).
223. Letter from John A. Beilein, Manager, Insurance Services Office of Maryland, to
Insurance Commissioner (Sept. 20, 1977).
224. Letter from Edward J. Birrane, Jr., Insurance Commissioner, to John A. Beilein
(Oct. 4, 1977).
225. Judge Smith stated for the majority,
Insurance companies have not shown a reluctance in the past to write
into their policies such restrictions as they deem to be in their best
interest, yet no restriction relative to the issue at bar appears in the
policy issued by F & D. Surely since the decision in Lazenby 14 years
ago, if not before, these companies have been congnizant of the fact that
they might be called upon to pay an award such as that at issue in this
case. As a consequence, they probably have considered such a possibility
in establishing rates.
283 Md. at 242-43, 389 A.2d at 367.
226. It is not clear at this time, how many of the insurers that issue policies in this
state will seek either to amend those policies and exclude punitive damages
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In December, 1978, the Prudential Property and Casualty
Insurance Company asked the Insurance Division to reconsider its
previous rejection of a punitive damages exclusion that Prudential
proposed to add to its umbrella personal liability insurance policy.227
Pointing out that no court decision or statute precluded the
contractual right of an insurer to exclude punitive coverage in an
excess specialty insurance contract by express policy language,
Prudential's position was that the proposed express exclusion
is merely to clarify any perceived ambiguity in the policy.
We do not provide this coverage, and seek only to clarify this
for our policyholders in order to avoid needless confusion
and litigation over this issue. The formal exclusion does not
reduce or change present coverage, and we would continue to
defend (at the insured's request) punitive damages claims
made in conjunction with covered (negligence) claims. 228
In support of its request for permission to add the exclusion,
Prudential set forth the usual arguments that because punitive
damages are designed for punishment and deterrence rather than
compensation, no useful purpose is se~ved by allowing a wrongdoer
to shift his liability to an insurance company, thereby, at the
expense of other purchasers of insurance, passing along his
responsibilities for, and the cost of, punitive damages to the citizens
of the state, the very people to whom he or she is a menace. 229 The
insurer also pointed out that in cases where punitive damages are
warranted, the financial worth of the wrongdoer generally is
admissible to determine an amount sufficient to punish the
wrongdoer and to deter similar misconduct in the future. Therefore,
if a jury took into account a wrongdoer's financial condition in order
to award an exemplary verdict sufficient to punish him, the result

coverage or to raise their premium rates. At least one commentator has
suggested that competition in the insurance market does not encourage
insurance companies expressly to exclude punitive damages. See Haskell, The
Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability For Design and Punitive Damages - The
Insurance Policy and The Public Policy, 40 JOURNAL OF AIR LAw AND
COMMERCE 595, 633 (1974). It does not appear that many insurers in Maryland
had previously sought permission to add exclusionary endorsements to their
standard policies. At this writing, however, the Insurance Commissioner has
received several requests for such permission but the author is aware of none
that have been granted. Several insurers, however, recently have issued policy
renewals in Maryland that contain endorsements explicitly excluding coverage
for punitive damages, apparently without previously having obtained the
Insurance Commissioner's permission to do so.
227. Letter from Cynthia H. Levy, Law Department, Prudential Property and
Casualty Insurance Company, to John F. Crouse, Actuary III, Insurance
Division (Dec. 27, 1978).
228. Id.
229. Id.
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would be that an insurance company would pay a higher award for a
rich wrongdoer than for a poor one. 230
Emphasizing the financial impact upon policy holders of not
allowing such an exclusion, Prudential stated,
[I]f the burden of payment is shifted from the wrongdoer to
the insurer, other purchasers of insurance are ultimately
punished through higher rates, not the wrongdoer. This
result would completely abrogate the fundamental purpose
and public policy of punitive damages.
[O]ur present Personal Catastrophe policy rates are
based upon our past experience and normal trend factors.
Unlike many other carriers, since our policy language was
never intended to cover punitive damages there is no
premium loading included in our rates to cover this
exposure. Nor have we charged a premium or offered a buyback for expected punitive damage losses.
It can be said, however, that if we ultimately are required
to carry the burden of paying punitive damages rather than
the wrongdoer, our policyholders will face higher rates.

[T]he exclusion would favorably affect the majority of
the citizens of your state by upholding the purpose of
punitive damages, while avoiding the possible need to raise
rates in the future because of these claims if they are ever
deemed to be covered. Only relatively few people may be
adversely affected by this justifiable approach, those
committing such acts as to warrant punitive damages. 231
Disapproving Prudential's request for permission to explicitly
exclude punitive damages coverage from the policy in question, the
Insurance Division broadly stated its understanding of the F & D
court's holding to be that punitive damages are covered by a liability
insurance policy unless specifically excluded by the language of the
policy, and that it is not contrary to public policy in Maryland to
provide insurance for such damages. 232 The crux of the Insurance
Division's rejection was contained in the following statement:
The Court goes on to state that it might well be in the public
interest to include such coverages and that the deterrent
effect would be spread over a large group. They also point

230. [d.
231. [d.
232. Letter from John F. Crouse, Actuary III, Insurance Division, Department of
Licensing and Regulation, to Cynthia H. Levy, Law Department, Prudential
Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Jan. 16, 1979).
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out that insurance companies can and do control the
exposure either through rating or underwriting. Large
corporations and specialist [sic] such as lawyers or agents
and brokers would realize the consequence of an exclusionary endorsement but the average driver of an automobile or
a homeowner or a small businessman would not. The Court
did point out the problems that would face the small
businessman. 233
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the aforegoing review of the Maryland law of
liability for punitive damages and the insured's right to indemnity
against an exemplary award, it is suggested that two modifications
to the law as it presently exists in Maryland are desirable. The first
recommendation is that the common law as enunciated by the Court
of Appeals be modified. The second recommendation is that the
Maryland General Assembly provide statutory guidance to the
Insurance Division and the insurance companies it regulates.

A. Punitive Damages in Malicious Prosecution Actions
When presented with the appropriate case, the Court of Appeals
should assert its perogative to guide the evolution of the common
law of the state and follow Judge Levine's recommendation by
modifying the present law to require a higher degree of offensiveness
than is presently required as a precondition to punitive recovery in
malicious prosecution cases. The rules under which sufficient malice
to support a punitive award may be inferred from a finding that a
defendant instituted the initial proceeding against a plaintiff based
on something less than probable cause should be overruled.
The Court of Appeals has been asked to address that issue once
already. In the companion case to F & D, First National Bank of St.
Mary's v. Todd,234 the issue presented upon appeal was whether it
was against public policy to permit punitive damages awards to be
predicated solely upon the type of malice that is inferred from a want
of probable cause for bringing the suit that was the basis for the
malicious prosecution claim. 235 Judge Smith, again writing for the
court, stated that the court had previously held "that punitive
damages could be recovered in a malicious prosecution action if a
jury found 'a want of probable cause, plus malice, but that malice
might be inferred from a want of probable cause.' "236

233.ld.
234. 283 Md. 251, 389 A.2d 371 (1978).
235. ld. at 252, 389 A.2d at 372.
236. ld. at 255-56, 389 A.2d at 374.

1979]

Punitive Damages

269

He noted, though, that "our prior holdings may not be the
majority rule"237 because the authorities generally hold that
exemplary damages may be awarded in malicious prosecution
actions when there is proof of actual malice, and that such damages
may be properly assessed where the defendant's act was willfully
done, in a wanton and oppressive manner and in conscious
disregard of his civil obligations. 238 The court, however, never
reached the issue, finding instead that it had not been preserved for
appellate review. 239
Further, the F & D majority was vitally attuned to the inherit
difficulties presented by the common law regarding malicious
prosecution in Maryland. Considerable effort was spent by the
majority pointing out the likelihood of a basically well-meaning
businessman finding himself liable for both compensatory and
punitive damages in a malicious prosecution action after he had
instituted the initial action for what he believed to be good reason, to
protect his business interests.
In light of the relative ease with which punitive damages may be
recovered against a defendant in a malicious prosecution action even
if his conduct, objectively viewed, is not extreme or outrageous, it is
suggested that Judge Levine's theory of ensuring that punitive _
damages be assessed in all tort actio~s according to a uniform
standard of culpability, thereby furthering the punishment and
deterrence rationale behind exemplary awards, should become the
law of this state.

B. Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages
The F & D majority placed major emphasis upon the fact that
the General Assembly has made no pronouncements on the subject
of insurance coverage for punitive damages and therefore the court
had received no guidance from the normal policy-declaring department of the government to assist in its resolution of the issue
presented. 240 Finding "not the slightest suggestion of a 'constitutional or statutory provision' from which a public policy against
payment [by an insurer of a punitive award against its insured] is
deducible," the court made its own determination that" 'the common
sense of the entire community would [not] pronounce it' against
public policy for the Bank's insurance company to pay the judgment
for exemplary damages assessed against the Bank."241

237. Id. at 256, 389 A.2d at 374.
238. Id. The court quoted from 52 AM. JUR.2d Malicious Prosecution § 94 (1970) and
cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (Tent. Draft No. 19, 1973).
239. 283 Md. at 257, 389 A.2d at 374.
240. Id. at 239, 243, 389 A.2d at 365, 367.
241. Id. at 243, 389 A.2d at 367.

270

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 8

In light of those pronouncements by the Court of Appeals and
the Insurance Division's apparent hesitation to assert its authority
to permit exclusionary endorsements without more explicit directions from the judiciary, the need for legislative guidance is clear. It
is therefore recommended that at its earliest opportunity, the
General Assembly forbid protection by insurance indemnity against
exemplary awards. 242 It is suggested that despite the F & D court's
concern for the potential plight of the small businessman facing a
malicious prosecution award, the "common sense of the entire
community" as reflected in its microcosm, the jury, would be
surprised and offended if the jurors were instructed that they could
award damages for the purpose of punishing the defendant and
deterring other potential wrongdoers, yet were also aware that the
sum which they assessed as a punishment and a deterrent would
come not from the pockets of the defendant but from the coffers of an
insurance carrier.243 If the purpose of punitive damages is to punish
and deter, that purpose is adequately fulfilled only if the wrongdoer
suffers the immediate and personal consequence of his wrongdoing
without the ability to dissipate the immediate financial impact of his
punishment by shifting that impact away from himself or by
deferring it to a later point in time when his rates are increased or
his insurance is not renewed. Further, it is suggested that if
insurance carriers are required to provide coverage for punitive
awards, it is likely that many policy holders will be faced with
increased premium rates as the risk of punitive awards is spread
beyond those guilty of extreme and outrageous conduct to the
insurance purchasing population as a whole. Even if insurance
carriers are allowed the option of providing or refusing punitive
assessment coverage, it seems probable that inequities will result.
Business entities and wealthy individuals could more readily afford
to pay increased premiums to obtain optional coverage for potential
punitive liabilities than could less well-to-do persons. Such a
situation therefore results in the anomaly of the wealthy tort-feasor
virtually escaping financial punishment for his wrongs while the
poorer one bears the full impact of punitive liability for his
wrongdoing. The "common sense of the entire community" should be
offended by such a result.
242. On February 23, 1979, S. 1089 was introduced in the Senate of Maryland. The
declared purpose of the bill was to render "the payment of punitive damages by
insurance companies ... against public policy." The Legislature, however,
rejected the bill.
243. In light of current law regarding the mention of insurance before a jury, jurors
could not actually be told that the defendant had insurance coverage for any of
the wrongs alleged. See, e.g., Snowwhite v. State, Use of Tennant, 243 Md. 291,
221 A.2d 342 (1966).

